

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD382049

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: **unclassified**

FROM: **confidential**

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

**Approved for public release, distribution
unlimited**

FROM:

**Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.
agencies only; Administrative/Operational
Use; Feb 1966. Other requests shall be
referred to Office, Chief of Research and
Development [Army], Attn: CRDBES,
Washington, DC 20301.**

AUTHORITY

ARO ltr, 20 Oct 2004; ARO ltr, 20 Oct 2004

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AD- 382049

SECURITY REMARKING REQUIREMENTS

ODD 8880.1-A, DEC 78

REVIEW ON 01 FEB 84

SECURITY

MARKING

**The classified or limited status of this report applies
to each page, unless otherwise marked.
Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.**

**THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,
U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF
ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY
LAW.**

**NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other
data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-
nitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government
thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and
the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any
way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not
to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing
the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights
or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that
may in any way be related thereto.**

AD 382049

ER

R

Q

Best Available Copy

CONFIDENTIAL

ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA
VOLUME I

In addition to security requirements which apply to this document and must be met, each transmittal outside the agencies of the U.S. government must have prior approval of the Office, Chief of Research and Development, DA, ATTN: CRDBES, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

When no longer needed, this report may be destroyed in accordance with applicable regulations.

1 February 1966

REGRADED **CONFIDENTIAL**

ON 26 April 1967

PER C. J. CANELLA
Colonel, GS
Chief, Behavioral
Sciences Division

DD

JUL 3 1967

GROUP 3
Downing, M. & 19 Year Internals
Not Automatically Declassified

HISTORICAL EVALUATION AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

2233 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGES
—
ARE
MISSING
IN
ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA
(Volume I)

A Report prepared for the Army Research Office
under Contract No. DA-49-092-ARO-102,
dated 6 May 1965

No statements or opinions expressed in this report or its annexes are to be interpreted as reflecting official views of the Army Research Office or of any official of the United States Government

Not to be quoted at length, abstracted, or reproduced without the specific permission of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, except in official publications of the Department of Defense

GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12 Year Intervals
Not Automatically Declassified

Historical Evaluation and Research Organization
2233 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C., 20007

1 February 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

"This document contains information affecting the meaning of the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C. Section 793 and 794. Its transmission or communication to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

Table of Contents

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
SUMMARY		vii
Purpose of the Study		vii
Survey and Analysis of Experience		vii
Summary of Conclusions		viii
Current Applicability of the Study's Conclusions		xi
Relationship of Counterinsurgency to Isolation		xii
PREFACE		xiii
Purpose of the Study		xiii
Scope and Content		xiii
Study Participants		xiv
INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF GUERRILLA WAR		1
General Observations		1
The Spectrum of Guerrilla Warfare		3
Part One: The Guerrilla and Local Support		5
I THE NATURE OF LOCAL SUPPORT		5
Voluntary Support		5
Forced Support		6
Factors of Local Support		7
Summary		12
II ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM LOCAL SUPPORT		15
Drawing Support Away from the Guerrilla		15
Action to Deny Guerrillas Access to Local Support		17
Military Forces		20
Military Civic Action		21
Psychological Warfare		22
Population and Supply Control		23
The Role of Intelligence		24

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
<u>Part Two: The Guerrilla and External Support . . .</u>		27
III	THE NATURE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT	27
	General	27
	The International System and Insurgency	29
	Insurgency and Subversion	31
	Insurgency and Western Opinion	34
	The Spectrum of Outside Nonmilitary Support . . .	36
	The New Colonialism	40
IV	NONMILITARY ASPECTS OF ISOLATION FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT	43
	The International Environment	43
	Limiting Factors of Insurgent Success	44
	Outside Political Support and Countermeasures .	46
	Exploitation of Communist Weaknesses	49
	Outside Psychological Support and Countermeasures	49
	Outside Economic Support and Countermeasures .	51
	Summation	54
V	MILITARY ASPECTS OF ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT	55
	General	55
	Transborder Sanctuary	55
	Direct External Support	57
	Interdiction of External Support by Cutting the Guerrilla Line of Communication within the Afflicted Country	60
	Drawing the Guerrilla Away from his Outside Support	63
<u>Part Three: Evaluation</u>		65
VI	CONCLUSIONS	65
	General	65
	Isolation from Local Support	66
	Isolation from External Support	69
VII	A THEORY OF ISOLATION	73
	Introduction	73
	A Model of Counterinsurrection: A Form of Political Warfare	74

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
	Conditions for Selecting Isolation	
	Tactics	75
	The Elements of Isolation Strategy	77
	The Impact of Ideology	79
	Summation	81
VIII	APPLICABILITY OF CONCLUSIONS TO CURRENT PROBLEMS	83
	General	83
	Possible Applications in Vietnam	83
	Application to Counterinsurgency Readiness .	89
	Relationship of Isolation to Modern Counterinsurgency	91
	Appendix A--Terms of Reference	93
	Appendix B--Summary Analysis of Measures to Isolate Guerrilla Forces	97
	--Notes	99

List of Supporting Volumes

CLASSIC AND BASIC CASE STUDIES
(Volume II)

Guerrillas in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era, by Peter Paret	1
Upper Burma, 1885-1890, by Frank H. Brooke	21
The Boer Guerrillas, 1900-1902, by Frank H. Brooke	33
France and the Guerrilla War in Vietnam: 1945-1954, by Frank N. Trager	47
The Republic of Vietnam and Communist Insurgency, 1954-1965, by William A. Nighswonger	91
The Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949, by S.M. Chiu	135
Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency Efforts in Greece, 1941-1949, by Gunther E. Rothenberg	173

Malaya, 1948-1960, by Riley Sunderland	217
Guerrilla Operations in South Korea, 1945-1953, by Riley Sunderland and Marshall Andrews	249
Appendix A--French Experience in Vietnam: Geographic and Historical Setting, by Frank N. Trager	265
Introduction to Vietnam	267
Vietnam: The French Intrusion and Conquest to the 1880s	275
French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles for Inde- pendence, 1885-1925	289
French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles from the Mid-1920s through World War II	315
General Observations on French Counterinsurgency Experience and Practice Prior to World War II . .	321
Bibliography	327

SUPPORTING CASE STUDIES
(Volume III)

North America: The Revolutionary Period, by John Shy . . .	1
The American Civil War, by Marshall Andrews	21
North America: The Indian Wars, by R. Ernest Dupuy . . .	55
The Philippine Insurrection, November 1899-July 1902, by Linnea P. Raine	77
The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: The Hukbalahap, 1942-1955, by Charles T.R. Bohannan . . .	117
The Irish Troubles, 1916-1921, by Gunther E. Rothenberg .	145
The German Experience in World War II, by Gunther E. Rothenberg	163
Israel, by Gunther E. Rothenberg	181

The Hungarian Uprising, October 23-December 15, 1956, by Andrew C. Janos	207
A Summary of French Efforts at Isolating the Guerrilla During the Algerian Conflict, 1956-1962, by Peter Paret	229

CONFIDENTIAL

Isolating the Guerrilla

SUMMARY

Purpose of the Study

This study of "Isolating the Guerrilla" was undertaken for the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense to (1) examine and analyze historical experience in attempting to suppress guerrillas by isolating them from internal and external support and (2) suggest ways of applying the concept of isolating the guerrilla.

Survey and Analysis of Experience

The study presents detailed investigations of experience in 19 different guerrilla war situations, or campaigns, deemed to be particularly relevant to the concept of isolating guerrillas from their sources of internal or external support.* These individual case studies focus on the environment of guerrillas operations--social, political, and physical; the organization, motivation, and operational techniques of guerrilla

*These cases are: French Revolution and Napoleonic era; Burma, 1885-1890; Boer War, 1900-1902; France in Vietnam, 1945-1954; Communist Insurgency in Vietnam, 1954-1965; Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949; Greece, 1941-1949; Malaya, 1948-1960; South Korea, 1945-1953; American Revolution; American Civil War; American Indian Wars; Philippine Insurrection, 1899-1902; Hukbalahap Insurgency in the Philippines, 1942-1955; Ireland, 1916-1921; Israel, 1945-1948; Hungary, 1956; Algeria, 1956-1962. In addition, because of its particular relevance to the current serious US involvement in Vietnam, an appendix presents relevant aspects of the background of French involvement in Vietnam prior to 1945. The case study of the Chinese Civil War included a review of Japanese counterinsurgency operations against the Chinese Communists during World War II.

CONFIDENTIAL

forces; the composition and direction of external as well as local support; and, principally, the nature and results of counterinsurgent efforts to nullify this support and suppress the insurgency.

Either as authors of individual case studies and analyses or as consultants, reviewers, or editors, 26 scholars and specialists in the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency participated in the study. The results of the general analysis of the experience is presented in the first volume of the study report; the case studies themselves are contained in two additional volumes.

Summary of Conclusions

From a general analysis of the experience emerged a number of conclusions, summarized as follows:

General

Since an insurgency that enjoys appreciable popular support reflects a serious social maladjustment, the employment of military force to suppress it must be integrated with non-military measures to correct the maladjustment. The counterinsurgent effort should involve all departments of government and affect all elements in the society. To be effective, the guerrilla must have adequate local support, voluntary or forced, at a minimum including food and information. Physical and moral forms of external support can contribute substantially to effective insurgency. In the long run, success in isolating the guerrilla from his sources of internal and external support will permit the established government to seize the military initiative from the guerrilla and to assure his complete defeat due to his lack of recruits, supplies, and intelligence.

There are three fundamental preconditions for effectively isolating the guerrilla from local and/or external support: a high order of military competence in the counterguerrilla forces; an effective local administration working in close coordination with the military forces; and a perceptive and substantial response to popular grievances which have contributed to the insurgency.

Isolation from Local Support

The military are fundamentally handicapped in dealing with the guerrilla because he is a part of the indigenous society and thus not readily identifiable as an enemy. Until or unless soldiers can clearly identify and attack the guerrilla, indiscriminate military efforts may aggravate the very maladjustments that have produced the insurgency. The problem of identification has not yet been solved in a satisfactory, comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, general action designed to isolate him from the society can be effective and can contribute toward more precise identification, since the guerrilla is forced to fight to reopen or retain his links to the sources of his support.

Isolation of the guerrilla from local support should include measures aimed at: (a) withdrawing the local civilian populace from supporting or adhering to the insurgent cause, (b) inducing popular loyalty or support for the incumbent government, (c) physically denying guerrillas access to local support, and (d) defeating the insurgent forces militarily. The military can make significant contributions to the first two of these categories by various forms of civic action. Militarily protected physical obstacles have been effective in denying access to support through supply control, population control, and interference with the flow of information to guerrillas.

Administrative and military action against the guerrilla insurgent must be prompt, thorough, initially massive, and intensive in order to offset the guerrilla's inherent initiative advantage. Counterinsurgent responses that merely match, or offset, what the guerrilla is capable of doing will usually be too little and too late. The cost of protracted effort--in blood, treasure, and unfavorable political and economic consequences--is inevitably far greater than a deliberately massive effort at an early stage of the insurgency. Force ratios, however, cannot be applied with arithmetic rigidity. As troops and police improve in quality, fewer will be needed for combat operations, but more may be needed to secure pacified areas. As the guerrillas suffer casualties, the ratios against them will shift in turn, but to retain the initiative against the numerically reduced insurgents may still require extensive operations.

Unity of command and coordination of military and civilian effort (administrative, political, and psychological) by the counterinsurgent are important if the guerrilla is to be isolated. At the same time local commanders should be given

considerable latitude in offering conciliation, clemency, and rewards for defection. Any ethnic differences within the local population can be exploited to deny guerrillas supply, intelligence, recruits, and sanctuary.

Continuity of effective intelligence is essential in isolating the guerrilla and best achieved through a single civil police intelligence system. Military combat intelligence personnel should not attempt to compete with or to duplicate this civil system unnecessarily, but rather should avail themselves of its services through close and intensive liaison.

External Support

An insurgent guerrilla force eventually must receive sufficient outside moral support to obtain general or de facto recognition as a legitimate belligerent and eventually as a legal government. Decisive military success is not essential for the guerrilla to attract this support; the government, on the other hand, needs essentially total victory so that it can establish and maintain security for the population.

Military measures against outside support include: sustained pressure on the guerrilla to make support excessively costly for the supporting nation; exploiting any differences which may exist between him and the supporting power or powers; physical obstacles--including naval blockade and the sealing of land frontiers--to inhibit entry of supplies and reinforcements; punitive raids into sanctuaries. In this latter respect, guerrilla success has often been facilitated by the accessibility of territory of a friendly power which can be used: (a) as a base of supplies and reinforcements; (b) for refuge, training, and re-staging of guerrilla forces; and (c) for moral and public relations support, and communications with the outside world. Communist sponsorship of insurgencies has been particularly effective in exploiting the concept of physical sanctuary for guerrilla forces in nominally neutral or nonbelligerent territory. For a variety of reasons, including mutual nuclear capabilities of the superpowers, there has been in recent times great reluctance to intervene with conventional ground forces against sanctuaries.

Nonmilitary measures against outside support include: diplomatic pressures on other nations to prevent any formal recognition of the insurgents; measures seeking the continued diplomatic support of other nations; propaganda-psychological warfare

CONCLUSION

campaigns; economic pressures against nations providing any kind of support to the insurgents.

Communist-supported insurgency is a multifaceted form of war being intensively exploited by an enemy with a tactically flexible central doctrine. Communist use of insurgency for aggressive purposes through support of "wars of national liberation" has drastically modified the nature of the problems and challenges of insurgent warfare. This does not invalidate experience in the tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency, but it does require the development of new operational and organizational concepts for the application of these tactics and techniques.

Current Applicability of the Study's Conclusions

The study suggests that the conclusions summarized above can be applicable to current US problems in three major respects, as indicated below:

Possible Applications in Vietnam

Four specific suggestions are offered with respect to the war in Vietnam.

First, investigation should be undertaken of the feasibility and desirability of clearing a barrier strip, which would include suitable obstacles, along all or part of the land frontiers of South Vietnam. The report notes a number of serious problems and possible objections, but offers reasons why the barrier project warrants serious study and consideration.

(c) Second, one possible way of dealing with the sanctuary problem would be to send a force into southern Laos physically to block the Communists' use of this part of their sanctuary. This action might well be combined with the barrier project.

(c) Third, consideration should be given to undertaking covert long-range penetration raids into North Vietnam, employing guerrilla tactics against important objectives in the principal sanctuary for the Viet Cong.

(c) Fourth, as one way to reduce the combat risk and damage faced by South Vietnamese civilians in operational areas, consideration should be given to formal adoption of a policy of

CONFIDENTIAL

employing temporarily incapacitating chemical and biological agents in such areas when military considerations will permit. It is suggested that such a policy, despite current worldwide abhorrence of chemical and biological warfare, if properly presented to the American and world public, could bring political and psychological benefits to the US effort.

Current Counterinsurgency Readiness

Two suggestions were offered for current counterinsurgency readiness.

First is the development of a capability to commit, on short notice, forces suitably prepared for dealing with the military and civic action requirements of any conceivable insurgency situation. For such a force to be employed effectively, re-evaluation of current US military command and control organization, and of high-level interdepartmental coordination, would probably be necessary.

Second, there are ways in which the employment of new scientific developments may facilitate improved population control in counterinsurgency situations, in Vietnam or elsewhere. These developments include computerization for population registration and the use of harmless technical tests to ascertain where apparently innocent civilians, or captured prisoners, have recently been.

Relationship of Counterinsurgency to Isolation

The report presents a tentative "theory of isolation." It is stressed, however, that this is only one aspect of a much larger requirement for the United States to develop practical overall theory, doctrine, and organization to deal with the new challenge of Communist aggression through the support of guerrilla insurgencies which for propaganda purposes the Communists equate with "wars of national liberation."

CONFIDENTIAL

PREFACE

Purpose of the Study

This study of "Isolating the Guerrilla" has been undertaken by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization for the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, under contract to the Army Research Office. The study's terms of reference (Appendix A) required HERO to examine historical experience relevant to a politico-military technique of counterinsurgency: isolating guerrilla forces from internal and external support.

Scope and Content

In investigating this technique of isolating guerrilla forces, it was planned first to ascertain preconditions for its application, then to establish the military, political, and administrative measures involved, and, finally, to evaluate the results of these measures. From this data the study was to develop the critical aspects of the concept of isolating guerrilla forces and to suggest means of applying this concept.

Pursuant to this planned procedure, a group of 25 relevant cases was examined. Because the study assumed that the idea of isolation is unrelated to modern technology, the range of cases went back to the late 18th Century. However, since it is obvious that modern technology powerfully affects the physical capabilities of a state to isolate the guerrilla, the greater part of the research effort was devoted to the 20th Century, with a major emphasis on Southeast Asia.

In preparing case studies, participants were asked to focus on: the environment of guerrilla operations--social, political, and physical; the organization, motivations, and operational techniques of guerrilla forces; the composition and direction of outside as well as local support; and, finally and principally,

the description and the results of the counterinsurgent forces' effort to nullify this support and to suppress the insurgency. (A summary of the major aspects of each of the individual case studies is presented in tabular or matrix form in Appendix B.)

Analysis of the examples notes variations and differences among them, but mainly establishes both common and exceptional functional components of internal and external support, noting the relations of these components to the guerrillas. The actions taken to sever the links between the guerrillas and the various sources of their support were catalogued and appraised. Conclusions were then derived, which, in combination with the overall analysis, have provided a basis for a tentative approach to a theory of isolation. Finally, as required by the terms of reference, suggestions for implementing the theory of isolating the guerrilla, based upon the conclusions, are offered.

Volume I of this study report contains the report analysis. Volume II includes case studies which, for the purposes of this project, were classified either as classic or basic. The three classic examples were selected because they were deemed to include experience and practice in isolating the guerrilla which is still applicable despite advances in technology. The six basic cases were selected as examples directly relevant to dealing with Communist-inspired insurgency in the modern world.

Volume III includes ten supporting case studies, which offer relevant experience, but which have not been explored in the same detail as the basic examples.*

Study Participants

Listed below are the participants in this study of "Isolating the Guerrilla." The list includes authors of individual studies as well as those who served in a consultant, review, or editorial capacity.

*The apparent discrepancy between the total number of cases studied, and those noted above is due to the fact that two of the studies were not included in this report (because they proved to have no relevance) and four have been combined into an appendix in Volume II.


Marshall Andrews, Historian and Journalist; HERO Associate
Charles T.R. Bohannan, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS, Ret.;
 Special Consultant
Geoffrey, Lord Bourne, General, British Army, Ret.; Special
 Consultant
Frank H. Brooke, Major General, British Army, Ret.; Special
 Consultant
R. Ernest Dupuy, Colonel, USA, Ret.; HERO Staff Associate
Trevor N. Dupuy, Colonel, USA, Ret.; HERO Executive Director
Sin Ming Chiu, Associate Professor of History, Temple Uni-
 versity; Special Consultant
Edward B. Glick, Associate Professor of Political Science,
 Temple University; Special Consultant
M. Preston Goodfellow, Colonel, AUS, Ret., Journalist and
 Special Warfare Analyst; Special Consultant
Gay M. Hammerman, HERO Research Staff Member
Grace P. Hayes, HERO Research Staff Member
Mary F. Hoyt, HERO Research Staff Member
Andrew C. Janos, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
 University of California at Berkeley; Special Consultant
George Armstrong Kelly, IV, Assistant Director, Harvard De-
 fense Studies Program; Special Consultant
William A. Nighswonger, Research Associate in International
 Affairs, American University; Special Consultant
Wlodzimierz Onacewicz, Lecturer in History and Government,
 Georgetown University; HERO Staff Associate
Peter Paret, Associate Professor of History, University of
 California at Davis; HERO Associate
Steuart L. Pittman, Shaw, Pittman, Potts, Trowbridge and
 Madden, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil
 Defense; Special Consultant
Linnea P. Raine, HERO Research Assistant, Assistant Study
 Coordinator
Theodore Ropp, Professor of History; Duke University; HERO
 Associate
Gunther E. Rothenberg, Associate Professor of History,
 University of New Mexico; HERO Associate
John Shy, Associate Professor of History, Princeton Univer-
 sity; Special Consultant
Riley Sunderland, HERO Staff Associate, Study Coordinator
M. Ladd Thomas, Associate Professor of Political Science
 and Coordinator of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies,
 Northern Illinois University; HERO Associate
Frank N. Trager, Professor of International Relations, New
 York University; HERO Associate
Marcel Vigneras, Research Analysis Corporation; Special
 Consultant
Edward C. Williamson, Associate Professor of History and
 Political Science, Auburn University; Special Consultant

Particular acknowledgement must be given to those of the above-listed scholars who prepared the analytical papers which have formed the basis for the analytic report. These are: Mr. Andrews, General Brooke, Dr. Janos, Mr. Kelly, and Professor Rothenberg. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge an unsolicited contribution from Dr. Edward Gilfillan, Professor of Physics, Lowell Technological Institute, who, while working on another study for HERO, suggested that portion of Chapter VIII dealing with ways in which modern technology can be applied to the isolation of the guerrilla.

Coordination and surveillance of the professional effort in the study was performed by Mr. Riley Sunderland, Chairman of HERO's Research Committee, aided by Miss Linnea P. Raine, Assistant Study Coordinator. Responsibility for the production of this report is shared by Mrs. Judith Mitchell, HERO Administrative Officer, and her assistant, Mrs. Carol R. Sams.

Despite HERO's gratitude for the cooperation and contributions of the study participants, none of them, individually or collectively, should be held responsible for any portion of this report, or its supporting volumes, other than as may be specifically indicated.

As Executive Director of HERO, and as editor of this report, the undersigned assumes primary responsibility for its contents.



T. N. Dupuy
Executive Director

Washington, D. C.
31 January 1966

INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF GUERRILLA WAR

General Observations

Guerrilla warfare and guerrilla tactics may be closely related to each other, but not necessarily so. Guerrilla warfare throughout history has been the last resort of a desperate populace unable to overthrow repressive rule by any means other than armed revolt, and lacking conventional forces which could directly and overtly challenge the forces of the incumbent government. In taking up arms against the repressive ruling forces, the fighting man of the local population--the guerrilla--has perforce adopted tactics and techniques dictated by his relative military weakness. These guerrilla tactics reflect the following basic characteristics of the guerrilla:

1. The guerrilla operates on the principle of harassment or hit and run, rather than large-scale, sustained engagements. He does not stand up and fight, except under unusually favorable conditions, and he has no battle zone LOC.
2. The guerrilla is not easy to find or identify because (a) he is either indistinguishable from the local, uncommitted populace, or (b) he maintains himself regularly in hidden, remote, and relatively inaccessible hiding places when not operating, or (c) some combination of both is evident.
3. The guerrilla is operating against established forces of law and order; this provides him with several options but, fundamentally, it permits him to destroy without responsibility, inhibitions, or restrictions, save to the extent he may wish to curb destruction either to preserve resources for his own later use or to attract popular support and assistance (see below).
4. To survive and prosper the guerrilla needs various forms of active (though usually covert) assistance from the local populace, or substantial elements of it. As a corollary, the guerrilla is almost certainly doomed to failure if the populace is actively opposed to him and loyal to the forces of law and order.

The tactics and techniques of guerrilla forces have always been used to some extent by conventional forces, particularly when faced with the challenges of fighting guerrillas. These tactics and techniques have also been employed by partisans, who fit into the spectrum of military organization as irregular (and generally local) fighters, less well organized and generally less reliable than conventional forces, but distinguished from the true guerrillas by being more or less permanently organized into fighting units and more or less permanently engaged in military operations.

In this study we have not, however, attempted to distinguish between guerrilla warfare* and guerrilla tactics, or between guerrillas and partisans. For purposes of this study we have focussed on isolating the guerrilla in terms of isolating guerrilla, partisan, or conventional forces employing guerrilla tactics in support of insurgency. Not the least reason for this has been the fact that since World War II we find that guerrilla tactics have been introduced throughout troubled areas by major Communist powers for their own selfish interests, whether or not a truly guerrilla warfare situation existed.

It is useful to note that there is much in common between guerrilla wars and internal wars. But they are not necessarily identical. Not all internal wars utilize guerrillas, nor is all guerrilla war, properly speaking, internal. International wars are frequently accompanied by variants of guerrilla; we need only see from our examples that this was true of the Peninsular War of 1808-1812, the Tyrolean uprising of 1809, and the diverse partisan and resistance movements of World War II.

As Mao Tse-tung and others have insisted, guerrilla warfare will not occur where conventional conflict can serve the insurgents. (Nor is it likely to occur as a direct result of a wholly successful coup d'état.) On the other hand, unless an incumbent regime fails from the outset to command the loyalty of the regular army or substantial parts of it, guerrilla warfare will be the normal form of violence in an insurgency.

*The terms "guerrilla warfare" and "irregular warfare" are thus used synonymously in this report.

The Spectrum of Guerrilla Warfare

Various forms of guerrilla war are presented in the supporting papers of this study. Since the mechanisms of both internal and outside aid are apt to be influenced by the perspective from which the conflict is viewed, a summary of these forms is useful:

1. Guerrilla wars fought in response to imperial expansion and colonial penetration.
2. Guerrilla wars fought to hasten the ebb of colonialism.
3. Guerrilla wars fought against occupying powers and/or their puppets in a general war situation.
4. Guerrilla wars that were frankly civil and internal within a sovereign state, often connected with social revolt, or counterrevolution.
5. Variations and combinations of the above.

Guerrilla wars of the first category belong largely to a past epoch, although recurrences are possible where new imperialisms begin to weigh heavily on captive peoples. Aside from the broader consequences of the Cold War, the nuclear arms stalemate, and the Communist endorsement of "wars of national liberation," the particular potency of guerrilla activity in our era may be ascribed to a combination of all except the first form. What links the past and modern experiences is that the techniques of combat are (a) popular, in terms of involvement of local populations; (b) irregular and fluid; (3) internal or associated with home terrain; (d) developed for limited and frequently primitive armament; and (e) waged against an existing legal political structure on its own nominal territory.

The dislocations caused by general war (conquest, anarchy, hiatus of sovereignty, postwar conditions and settlements, etc.) have been extremely influential in the development of later guerrilla movement. Nationalism in Asia and Africa and the guerrilla insurrections it has prompted received a heady impetus from the experience of the thousands of colonial natives who had fought on the side of the Allies in the War of 1914-1918. The German and Japanese conquests and occupation policy of 1939-1945, together with European "loss of face" in the Orient, played a major role in the social, political, and anticolonial effervescence of the following years.

Guerrilla warfare has since World War II come into new importance as a substitute for large-scale conventional hostilities, when aggressive nations desire to extend their power. It has become a prelude to or a concomitant of successful seizure of specific world areas both by proponents of communism and by Communist states. They have dignified such unconventional hostilities as "wars of national liberation."

Part One: The Guerrilla and Local Support

CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF LOCAL SUPPORT

Investigation into guerrilla campaigns since the French Revolution re-emphasizes the vital dependence of the guerrilla upon local support for food, information, recruits, shelter, and supplies. With such support, he has not needed conventional lines of communication, and when pressed has simply disappeared into the general public. The advantage this has given him has compounded the inherent limitations of conventional military intelligence organizations and has substantially counteracted the tactical advantages in weapons and organization possessed by the established military, or counterguerrilla, force. Local support has been either voluntary or forced.

Such a classification should not, however, obscure the fact that human motivations are shifting, imprecise, and sometimes unclear even to the individual being motivated. There must always be a core of voluntary support for the guerrilla in any situation in which he receives considerable local support, no matter what pressures the guerrilla may put forth to exact forced support. As the guerrillas' fortunes improve, the general human desire to side with the winner is likely to lead more and more of the populace to provide support ever more willingly. Conversely, if the guerrilla begins to fail, voluntary support will dwindle from many who once cheered his success and gave him money and information, and they will later maintain they did so under duress. Thus local support can be taken as reflecting a collective state of mind, which both guerrillas and government attempt to influence.

Voluntary Support

One or both of two conditions has generally preceded the appearance of effective voluntary local support: (1) violent division over political, religious, ethnic, tribal, or other basic sentiment in the immediate area of irregular force operations;

(2) hostile or alien military occupation accompanied by the imposition of unacceptable political or religious requirements, oppressive requisitions, or unnecessarily harsh conduct, inspiring resistance and reprisal. Actually none of these latter obvious provocations must of necessity exist in the case of occupation. The simple reluctance to accept defeat can be, and has in fact often been, the genesis of guerrilla operations in occupied territory.

The first condition--divergent opinion of an ideological nature--generally produces localized irregular warfare, in which the guerrilla is either pitted against the local forces of law and order, or against other guerrillas. In the latter case, organized military forces of one or both sides are likely to enter the area and transform irregular into conventional warfare. In this case, guerrilla operations may continue as subsidiary to those of organized forces, or the guerrilla bands may be absorbed into them, abandoning both their identity and their modus operandi. Without such interposition, local guerrilla warfare may continue indefinitely and with mounting ferocity and (usually) futility.

The second condition--hostile military occupation--often leads to warfare of last resort; that is, the continuance of regular war by irregular means after major reverses in the field. The conduct of such operations may involve not only armed civilians and irregular forces, but fragments of defeated armies.

Both of these conditions and cases may be clearly recognized in the history of irregular warfare. Examples of both situations appear historically, often in conditions and combinations of sometimes great complexity. The historical case studies show that guerrillas in the first case (internal insurgency or civil war) strive to convert it to the second situation, in which their opponents will appear in the role of foreign oppressors or invaders.

Forced Support

This is a feature of guerrilla warfare that might be compared to organized crime. That is, members of the public, caught up in an area where guerrillas are operating, must furnish supplies and remain silent, under threat of death. Not unnaturally, as demonstrated in Vietnam during and since the French period, most people have usually cooperated when faced with such a choice.

Forced support is most easily imposed in areas where there has been a shattering of the colonial social and power structure, widespread and grinding poverty, weak or almost nonexistent local administration, or some combination of these conditions. In such circumstances, a few well-organized, intelligent, dedicated, trained, ruthless men offering a combination of threats and promises are assured of easy victims. This situation has often been remediable, however, by the introduction of effective pacifying forces under whose shelter measures can be undertaken to help the community regain self-confidence and police itself.

In the past, forced support, with its requisitions in cash and kind, has placed temptations in the way of guerrillas to which they often succumbed, degenerating into banditti. In recent years, Communist discipline has provided control, while Communist doctrine has given guerrillas a strong incentive to understand and maintain the difference between forced support and mere banditry, as well as providing a guide to the most effective means of extracting support.

Factors of Local Support

In considering local support one may identify a number of subsidiary factors common to all guerrilla warfare. In the scope of a report that examines only one counterinsurgent technique, these factors can only be touched upon; their detailed examination can be attempted only in a study of the whole phenomenon of guerrilla war.

Ideology

Ideological differences are understood to mean those conflicts in fundamental intellectual or emotional loyalties (usually relating to politics or religion) that have operated to set citizens of the same country at one another's throats.* In this connection, one may note the classical nature of the Vendean uprising (Vol. II, p. 1), in which Breton and Norman peasants rallied round both priests and nobles, inspired patently by motives both religious

*A definition of ideology in the Oxford Universal Dictionary reads as follows: "A system of ideas concerning phenomena, esp. those of social life; the manner of thinking characteristic of a class or an individual."

and political. The Napoleonic Wars (*ibid.*) brought with them a number of politically inspired guerrilla wars, of which that in Spain is best known. The American Civil War (Vol. III, p. 21) furnishes examples of guerrilla war with widespread local political support for both sides, in which political opinions were largely ideological in nature. Consequently, guerrilla bands like Quantrill's could range surprisingly far, and bloody and indecisive guerrilla war continued in several regions on into the peace.

Since the appearance of communism, the role of ideology as a basis for local support has become even more significant than in the past. And since Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China use Communist ideology for their nationalistic purposes, most aspects of Communist guerrilla warfare seem better discussed in the context of outside support. However, it should be noted here that all Communist guerrilla campaigns have been conducted in recognition of the necessity for local support, and that when sufficient support was not likely to be spontaneous, a cadre of skilled guerrillas has been infiltrated to establish bases of local support from which to campaign. In Korea (Vol. I, p. 249) this was only partly successful but in Vietnam (Vol. I, pp. 47 and 91) establishment of these bases of local support has materially aided the guerrilla cause.

Socio-Economic Factors

As noted above, most guerrilla activity in recent years has appeared in areas characterized by poverty, and by a shaky social, economic, and political structure. Before the appearance of Marxism-Leninism both remedies and appeals tended to be local, and insurgent episodes were often settled with a minimum of outside consequences. Since then, communism and abstract Communist theory have provided panaceas with wide appeal to peoples in several stages of economic and social development.

The Russian revolution is an example of socio-economic and political factors combining to produce a rebellion where Marxist doctrinaires had not expected it. Though the leaders of the revolt were intellectuals rather than peasants or workers, and though Russia was an agricultural rather than an industrial power, nevertheless the grievances were there, and the Communists altered their doctrine to exploit them.

In contemporary insurgency the socio-economic factor, particularly when an underprivileged group appreciates both its condition and the possibility of improving it, is especially important,

since it leads in economically distressed areas to eager acceptance of almost any promise of equality and plenty. This in turn will generate local support, and from a wide range of social classes, even though such support may be directly opposed to the long-term interests of the people involved. A socio-economic response from the Western powers--if it can transcend cultural, political, linguistic, and military barriers--might well be decisive in meeting this particular challenge. If, however, the insurgents bar such action by force, then it seems irrefutable that access to the area can be gained and maintained only by military force, which must then provide security for an effective socio-economic effort.

Psychological Factors

All factors contributing to local support have psychological aspects. Moreover, in all guerrilla campaigns psychological techniques have been consciously employed in propaganda in some form and to some degree to gain local support. The promise of escape from poverty, for example, is enormously attractive. Injecting the epithet "colonial," regardless of the facts of the case, has done much to win voluntary local support in those countries which have a history of colonial rule.

Recent events have shown that measures to lessen the harshness of counterinsurgency, to conquer without killing, as by the use of nonlethal gases, defoliation, food control, can be distorted to the advantage of the insurgent. Moreover, as in the US involvement in Vietnam, ethnic and religious differences, and charges of imperialism and colonialism, can be skillfully exploited.

A most important psychological aspect of local support is the widespread reluctance of the public to give information to the government. In any society it is evident that in comparable situations the guerrilla need only exploit an existing psychological weakness in the relation of a government to its people.

Operational Factors

Local support affects every aspect of the guerrilla's operations. His operational problems appear different from those of the regular soldier in either conventional or guerrilla operations, but they are, in their fundamentals, identical. For example, both guerrilla and regular soldier must eat; both require ammunition; both need intelligence; both must have replacements. For the

guerrilla, most of these operational requirements are met entirely or in part from local civilian support.

The guerrillas' military objectives are either to assist in the operations of conventionally organized forces, to overthrow the established government through a popular or spontaneous uprising, or to develop their own capability to pass from guerrilla warfare to large-scale hostilities as conventionally organized forces. Operations in pursuit of these military objectives can include harassment of hostile lines of communication, collection of intelligence, destruction of materiel, ambush of enemy detachments, attacks on isolated detachments, terror directed against the guerrilla's social enemies, and diversion of enemy forces from conventional to counterguerrilla missions.

In modern guerrilla operations inspired or exploited by the Communists, the campaign is planned long in advance, and trained cadres are infiltrated into the area to establish themselves at strategic points (as in South Korea before 1950, Vol. II, p. 249, and as in South Vietnam between 1954 and 1956). If a genuine local insurrection can be promoted without involving the intruders and the sponsoring Communist power in military action, so much the better. If that objective fails, then the intruders seek to establish local support by terror, waging guerrilla warfare in the guise of a genuine local insurrection. In either event, resistance is denounced under various epithets, e.g., "reactionary," or "colonialist."

Intelligence

The guerrilla who enjoys local support has a constant and effective intelligence and security service at his command. The local people, circulating freely, keep him informed of every move his adversaries make. Conversely, through sympathy or fear, counterguerrilla forces moving through the guerrilla base area find that the local population furnishes no information. The predicament of the counterguerrilla forces is compounded by the fact that conventional intelligence sections of military units, trained to gather and process combat intelligence, are normally neither prepared nor manned to gather and process information on hundreds of individuals. The remedy would seem to be for the soldier to concentrate on creating an environment in which the policeman--who is trained to handle such information--can work.

Recruitment

At the outset of guerrilla operations, recruitment of irregular forces is usually based on ideological and socio-economic causes. Sometimes recruits are obtained from fragments of defeated armies and civilians cut off by invasion. Reputations of successful leaders, and the material rewards of raiding are some of the elements which have appealed to adventurous or greedy individuals. The long-run effectiveness of the irregular unit often depends on which of the foregoing factors has motivated the recruit. In general, those men motivated by ideological and basic socio-economic factors prove the most reliable and the least likely to be diverted to objectives not connected with the underlying strategy.

In modern insurgency there have been some recruits for guerrilla bands attracted by adventure or economic opportunity, but most have come from three general sources: those infiltrated from the aggressor base (as from North Vietnam, since 1954), those recruited locally by ideological conviction, and those forced into guerrilla service by terror. In general, recruitment of irregular forces has not been a major problem for guerrilla leaders until isolation measures have become effective--as in operations against insurgents in the Philippines and Malaya in the late 1950s.

Control

Control of irregular fighters and their operations depends on such a great variety of factors that no more than two very general assertions appear justified: (1) irregular bands under direct military control generally operate productively toward accomplishment of broad strategic objectives; (2) those not so controlled often degenerate into lawless gangs. Those units established and recruited by individuals independently of the controlling authority rarely have been brought under its control.

In Communist-inspired guerrilla warfare--prevalent since 1917--guerrilla bands are held under rigid control by their devotion to a common ideology and by the efficiency of the apparatus created to propagate the ideology which, with few exceptions, has been communism. Those despatched by international communism to foment insurgency are chosen for their disciplined loyalty as well as for their skill, and all are thoroughly schooled in every step of their task and its ultimate goal. This system has been perfected empirically, operating with much greater efficiency in Southeast Asia than it did, for instance, in Greece or South Korea. By its increasing success it has developed a pattern which, in turn, may provide the ultimate clues to its defeat.

Environment

Environment is one of the decisive factors in irregular warfare, influencing the socio-economic forces which often have built up to revolt. Through propinquity, in favorable geographical circumstances, environment can also facilitate the intrusion not only of ideological unrest but of forces capable of directing this unrest against established government.

Insofar as the actual combat of irregular warfare is concerned, physical environment is directly conducive to success or failure. Historically, successful guerrilla warfare has often been based on terrain, such as mountains, heavy forests, or jungle, relatively inaccessible to formations organized for large-scale conventional war on the European model. The guerrilla's ability to operate at any given distance from his base depends on his mobility and on his relations with the civilian population contiguous to his base. (This, of course, is less applicable for the part-time guerrilla, who has usually played a part in insurgencies, particularly in South Vietnam.) The sooner the band can disperse after an attack and make its way individually back to base with the help of friendly or terrorized civilians, the greater the radius of its operations. The guerrilla band also must have the capability of detecting at a distance hostile approaches to the base, a service often performed by local civilians.

Under certain circumstances, cities can provide satisfactory bases for small-scale guerrilla operations which may produce large-scale results. In the atmosphere of disruption which ordinarily accompanies irregular operations, cities are filled with refugees among whom the guerrilla readily loses himself. Even without the refugees, large cities provide not only innumerable hiding places but valuable targets as well. Saigon, where there have been bloody assaults on US installations, is an excellent modern example. Not only are US and friendly Vietnamese personnel rendered constantly apprehensive, but propaganda advantages, such as forcing repatriation of US dependents, have been gained.

Summary

On the basis of the historical record it appears conclusive that:

1. Success of irregular forces is dependent upon support--or at least tolerance--by local civilians, whether voluntary or forced.

2. Local support of insurgent forces, as well as the insurgency itself, may arise from ideological, socio-economic, or personal sources. Support also may be induced by terror.

3. Controlled guerrilla activity often has been productive in supporting conventional warfare. Yet unless the strategic objectives of irregular forces coincide with those of the associated conventional forces, their operations may be not only pointless but harmful. Furthermore, uncontrolled guerrilla warfare usually degenerates into outlawry.

4. Environment as a factor in irregular force operations includes not only the terrain but the adjacent civilian population. A favorable environment--natural or created--is requisite to successful guerrilla operations.

CHAPTER II. ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

FROM LOCAL SUPPORT

Two procedures have proved successful in depriving guerrillas of local support: drawing popular support to the government and away from the guerrilla, and physically cutting the links between the guerrilla and the local population that supports him. Neither procedure is simple, and successful counterinsurgencies have generally made use of both in various combinations.

Drawing Support Away from the Guerrilla

If a substantial part of the local support which a guerrilla force has enjoyed is transferred to the local government, the guerrilla's effectiveness is drastically reduced. Complete transfer of loyalty results in collapse and defeat.

The specific action taken by a government seeking to withdraw support from a guerrilla movement depends, like any other political or military procedure, on the causes that led to development of the insurgency, the nature of the people involved, and whether or not the support received by the guerrillas is voluntary.

First, and most important, is the provision of security to the population by establishment of law and order through the introduction of military or civil police protection. This is particularly effective when support of the guerrilla movement has in large degree been achieved by force. This method was particularly successful in the Philippines, during the Philippine insurrection, where the Katipunan was operating with threats and severe punishment for those who did not support its guerrilla forces. A potential danger in police activity is the possibility of turning supporters of the government into supporters of the insurgents through overly harsh police action. This happened with the British troops in Ireland in 1916-1920, and there is evidence that overenforcement of the British government's policy in Palestine in 1945-1949 lent itself to propaganda that helped the guerrilla cause both externally and internally.

A basic method used to effect withdrawal of support is through the use of propaganda and public information media. Modern means of communication have greatly increased the potential means of spreading propaganda and their significance is attested by such examples as the uprising in Hungary, where one of the first objectives of both insurgents and counterinsurgents was to gain control of radio stations. Through propaganda a government may convince the guerrillas' supporters that loyalty to it promises better prospects of economic security, and/or personal freedom, than continuing support of the guerrilla. It can also convince them that failure to remain loyal will result in punishment.

Providing essential content to propaganda is action to remove the specific grievance that formed the basis for the rebellion and which the insurgents promise to remedy. This may not be too difficult, if it is a simple economic or political problem and the remedy is undertaken before the guerrilla movement has had time to develop much strength. But normally the problem is more complicated, since there is likely to be a combination of grievances that cannot easily be remedied without a fundamental change in government policy. The British in Malaya attempted to provide increased security and a better life, establishing police posts, good roads, water supplies, electricity, schools, clinics, and employment to the population of guerrilla areas. But these improvements were offered after the supporters had been physically separated from the guerrilla by barbed-wire fences around the new villages; fences patrolled by police and Home Guards and lighted at night. Resettlement offers the most direct means of interdicting local support but it is also the most complicated and expensive. The problem is understood in South Vietnam; it has not yet been solved satisfactorily.

Further step, used, for instance, in both of the Philippines examples, and in Malaya, is the promise of amnesty to all who forswear the guerrilla cause and pledge allegiance to the established government. Carrying the threat of punishment through to execution, as in exiling Filipino Insurrecto leaders to Guam, may also serve to withdraw support for the cause, although such terror tactics may have the opposite effect and increase support, as did the execution of the revolutionary leader, José Rizal.

One of the safest generalizations to emerge from the case studies has been that the incumbent, particularly if a foreign occupant, will exploit successfully ethnic divisions to deny the guerrilla supply, intelligence, recruits, and sanctuary. The most outstanding example is British isolation of Chinese guerrillas

from the Malayans, the French and American use of the Montagnards in Vietnam, and the exploitations of Serbo-Croat differences by the Germans during World War II.

Action to Deny Guerrillas Access to Local Support

The measures or methods to draw popular support from the guerrilla will, in general, take time to develop full effectiveness. Furthermore, by themselves they cannot be fully effective if the guerrilla remains, at any stage, capable of armed action and perhaps capable of regaining the initiative. Military operations and administrative (or civic) action designed to facilitate military operations will yield immediate results in cutting off local support for guerrillas and will reinforce and accelerate the effects of the efforts to withdraw popular support discussed above.

Military operations will necessarily have the primary aim of destroying the armed forces of the insurgents while protecting ambient civilians from guerrilla exactions. In effect, because of the guerrilla's elusiveness and hit-and-run tactics, this takes the form of a progressive whittling down of his fighting strength in a number of small-scale actions. By the nature of his logistic organization the guerrilla is unlikely to be able to concentrate a large force in one place, except for a limited time. At the outset of the insurgency, and perhaps for an extended period, the guerrilla has the initiative and the government forces will be essentially on the defensive, holding the main towns and other vital points, and the communications linking them. This will also include efforts to bring the insurgents to battle if the government forces are adequate. Once this "framework" phase has been established and the government need not fear the loss of the capital city or other vital centers, then the next phase can begin. This is when the government's armed forces can regroup and take the offensive.

To isolate the guerrilla from support, government forces have used several alternative tactical solutions. The first is to keep the insurgents on the run by the use of mobile columns of adequate strength. This entails good intelligence and a mobility superior, or at least equal, to that of the guerrillas. There are many examples of this type of antiguerilla operation, such as those of the British in South Africa in 1900-1902, and the Americans in the Philippines, at about the same time. In both cases the colonial counterinsurgents were successful in the end, but large forces had to be used and the campaigns took many

months to complete. Similar tactics were applied by the French in crushing some of the early insurrections in Vietnam, and also by use of paratroops later in Algeria.

In these instances the government forces sometimes deliberately isolated the guerrilla from his sources of supply by burning farms, mills, and granaries and driving off livestock. A guerrilla force based on a sympathetic rural population from whom it is acquiring food, clothing, and animal transport is particularly vulnerable to this form of attack. Conversely, insurgents based mainly on towns, and operating only in small numbers, may be less vulnerable because, first, their supply problem is usually smaller and, second, since they can merge into the urban population more or less at will, their sources of supply can be more easily concealed. Ireland and Palestine are examples of this type of insurrection.

Once his source of supply (or of information, or of recruits) is threatened or actually cut, the guerrilla must fight to restore his links to his support or to obtain new sources. This provides the government forces with opportunities to continue and to intensify military pressure and attrition.

In an urban environment--again as in Ireland and Israel--the guerrilla's prime supply problem is likely to be that of arms and ammunition. The IRA, for instance, was suffering severely from a shortage of ammunition immediately before the British government offered negotiations, and it is probable that the Israelis would have had the same difficulty had the conflict been prolonged.

Frequently in the past, when government forces have embarked on campaigns to destroy sources of supply, this has been carried out with a harshness that tends to be counterproductive. In some cases, reprisals have been official policy designed to punish local inhabitants for supplying the guerrillas and to be a deterrent for the future. The American Revolutionary War, Ireland, and Palestine afford examples, however, in which the reprisal action itself became counterproductive. In the Vendée, the destruction of property clearly contained this element of punishment, combined with terror, but as a policy it was eventually abandoned after its ineffectiveness was realized.

The lesson is clear: extreme policies against the inhabitants and their property seldom have the direct effect of isolating the guerrilla, and thus hastening the end of the insurrection, unless combined with the process of isolating the guerrilla, and with some offer of clemency and conciliation. This is often effective in drawing discouraged or partially committed, part-time

guerrillas back to the government fold. (It is also often effective with the guerrilla leaders themselves.) It is noteworthy that often the military authorities are more ready for conciliation (from a position of strength) than their political masters. Outstanding examples of this are General Kleber in the Vendée and General Kitchener in South Africa. Both generals, if left to themselves, could probably have ended the insurgency at the point where they felt that military measures had had sufficient effect to justify conciliation to some degree. In Malaya, amnesties and clemency afforded to guerrillas--combined with cash payments--had a successful cumulative effect in inducing mass surrenders. It must be noted, in this context, that an adequate degree of military pressure on the guerrilla (including both attrition and the denial of supplies) is an essential prerequisite to any conciliatory approach.

Another method of denying the guerrilla access to support is by exploitation of natural obstacles, or creation of artificial ones. If there is no mountain range, sea, or river, then the artificial obstacle has often been an adequate substitute: blockhouse line, the wire fence, the mine field, or the wall. Sometimes such a man-made barrier may be used in combination with, or in prolongation of, a natural obstacle. The aim is to restrict the freedom of movement of the guerrilla, to separate him from an area source of supply, or to delimit an operational zone. An artificial obstacle can be used for these purposes to deny support locally or from outside (e.g., the electrified and mined wire fences put up by the French in Algeria to close the Moroccan and Tunisian frontiers) but when not watched continually by security forces it is not effective. Examples in this study of the successful use of artificial obstacles are the British blockhouse lines in South Africa and the floodlit wire fences round the "new villages" in Malaya. In the former case the blockhouse lines were a useful supplement to the mobile columns and farm-burning policy. In the latter, the fences, apart from protecting the village from surprise attack, were an extremely effective way of separating the guerrilla from his source of supply. The fact that artificial obstacles have been less successful in South Vietnam seems due to other administrative and military failures, clearly described in the relevant case study (Vol. II, p. 91).

A feature common to all the antiguerilla campaigns examined in this study is the considerable time taken to bring each to a conclusion. The one exception is the Hungarian revolt of 1956. All the other examples ended only after years of conflict, and in most of these a large proportion of the time was taken up by

the government's slowly escalating efforts to cut off the insurgents from support. The moral is obvious: to succeed, the government should realize at the outset that it cannot expect quick results against determined guerrillas, who by definition have at least some support from the mass of the population, until and unless this support has been cut off.

Military Forces

In modern industrialized countries, military forces exist primarily for defense against conventional external threats. Thus the needs of guerrilla war have often required drastic changes in military organization, sometimes permanently. Examples are the American emphasis on cavalry in operations against the Plains Indian in the 19th Century, and the raising of infantry by the British in Burma and South Africa. The Germans in the Balkans developed the Jagdkommando which is an example of the "special force," or "counterband" concept. This concept is often an attractive one, but the balance of evidence in our cases suggests (though it does not prove) the preferable alternative of retraining and reequipping regular units. The "special force" has often proved counterproductive and seems susceptible to reliance upon a policy of reprisal and terror. Its excesses (whether proved or not) have often provided valuable propaganda material for the insurgent.

The selection of the military commander for counterinsurgency operations is of supreme importance, for--even more than in conventional warfare--he needs special attributes. The antiguerrilla high commander must be extremely resourceful, of flexible mind, and, above all, able to see beyond purely military requirements for victory and to appreciate the human and political elements involved in the struggle. Although seldom possible, the ideal leader would wield political as well as purely military power, as did General Arthur MacArthur in the Philippines, and (to an even greater extent) Field Marshal Sir Gerald W.R. Templer in Malaya. Though Templer's political power was far from unlimited, he had a sympathetic metropolitan government behind him, and his position as head of the local government gave him effective control of the civil administration. He was, therefore, able to carry out far-reaching policies aimed at isolating the guerrilla by means other than military, e.g., resettlement, "winning the hearts and minds of the people," propaganda and, most importantly, guiding nationalist aspirations and emotions. As a senior general of great ability he was able to direct the military effort and harmonize it with his civil aims; a rare combination, but undeniably effective.

Finally, there is the question of the ratio of the strength of the government's forces to that of the insurgents. This is at least indirectly relevant to the question of isolation, in the light of the nature of the missions to be performed. The ratio is not easy to assess with certainty, as it is complicated by such factors as terrain, relative armament, mobility, and the effect of airpower in modern times. It is, however, evident that if only for purposes of territorial control, government forces must secure a definite numerical predominance before the victory can be won. The ratio (when it can be determined at all) varies widely in the cases studied. In the Boer War the total of British forces deployed approached the sum of the whole Boer population in the main operational areas, and the ratio of combatant strength was of the order of ten to one in the later phases. The civil war in Greece produced, in 1947, a ratio of rather more than six to one in favor of the government; in Malaya, in 1948, the initial superiority of the government forces was small, but after the defensive (or "framework") phase, it rose steadily until 1959, when a position was reached in which two or three highly trained regular battalions were hunting down a dozen Communist guerrillas in a particular area.

Military Civic Action

It is clear from many of the case studies that the betterment of the living conditions of the mass of the people is an important factor in any attempt to isolate the guerrilla from local support. This has been discussed in general terms earlier as an important administrative aspect of drawing popular support from the guerrilla to the government. But it has direct military implications, also.

The political aim of improved living conditions is often combined with the military need to remove and resettle part of the population for operational purposes, and it is in this sector that organized military forces can be of great value. Also, military forces can act quickly. In addition to supplementing or even temporarily replacing the ordinary local forces of law and order, and thereby ensuring the protection and security of the people, they can do much in improving their physical conditions and environment. Experience in South Vietnam since 1954 is striking corroboration of the thesis that no large-scale civic program in the context of guerrilla warfare is likely to succeed without a minimum level of public security.

The use of troops in resettlement schemes has been common in recent years. The French army played a large part in the civil administration in Algeria and carried out resettlement, but at first its prime aim was to clear operational areas. In Malaya, British troops did much good work during the movement of the Chinese squatters to the "new villages," and in the early stages of the building of the villages. Army engineers helped with roads, bridges, and water supplies. Army doctors and medical orderlies set up informal clinics (as US forces are doing in Vietnam today) and quite normally helped out in the local civil hospitals, which were often understaffed. Much good will accrued when service transport, including aircraft and helicopters, was made available to take sick people to hospitals in emergency. Infantry battalions often "adopted" new villages (some of them were named by their inhabitants after the regiment or its commander) and played a large part in developing the community. Band concerts, movie shows, children's parties, and football matches were organized by the troops, and it is not too much to say that popularity merged into affection in many cases. Many of these activities were publicized by the press and the Government Information Service and did much to bring the people to the side of the government.

Psychological Warfare

From the point of view of a government confronted with insurgency, psychological warfare has two aspects, one negative, the other positive. The negative one is denial to the enemy (the insurgent) of the opportunity to "get across" his case to his supporters, local or outside, preventing its dissemination by censorship methods or physical controls on the media of communication. The positive aspect is destruction of the insurgent's case and, at the same time, destruction of his will to fight, or reduction of the support he needs for fighting effectively.

The positive aspect is, in essence, to get into the mind of the guerrilla, and of his supporter in the local civilian population, and to convince them that there is no hope of guerrilla victory. Dostoevski wrote, "To destroy a man utterly it is necessary only to prove that his work is useless," and this is true of the guerrilla who often has to live mainly on hope. Propaganda must be directed mainly to this end and reiterated endlessly. Every possible means of psychological warfare must be used, including "black" and "grey" if possible, even if it is not necessarily credible at the time. This type of propaganda should be regarded always as an essential component of offensive action, and not as a substitute for it.

Population and Supply Control

Some form of population control is essential in dealing with any form of subversion. It is even more important as a basis for most measures necessary in isolating the guerrilla. It is a big task for the government to learn as much as possible about every individual, but it has been achieved in one form or another, throughout history. The first essential is a registration of the population, and some form of personal identification. The ideal, from the government point of view, is an identity card with photograph, issued universally, with safeguards against forgery and duplication. This is a task for the civil police, but troops may also have to be used, and will probably be needed in any case to man checkpoints and to carry out surprise checks.

An additional instrument of population control is the travel permit to allow surveillance of internal movement and to discourage the guerrilla from using "open couriers." Such a system is ponderous, involving much administrative and clerical work. In addition booths and huts for carrying out searches of individuals have to be provided, together with the necessary staff, including women searchers. Some administrative streamlining can generally be achieved, however, by partially combining the apparatus for population control with the organization for supply control. The aim of both controls is to prevent, or at least to hinder, communication between the guerrilla and the populace. The administration of both is necessarily local in character, with clearly defined areas of responsibility.

Population control was quite successful in Malaya, but has been much less so in Vietnam. Vietnamese authority embarked on a large-scale program in 1961, but by that time it was too late, since they could not reach the extensive portion of the population under Viet Cong control for comprehensive fingerprinting, registration, and the like. As a result, it has been estimated that population control has only been about 50% effective.

Supply control consists initially of a list of proscribed articles, whose sale or movement is either prohibited or regulated. This entails a comprehensive government organization embracing manufacturing sources, wholesalers, and retail outlets. Restricted articles fall into three main groups--arms and ammunition; clothing, food, and medical supplies; and propaganda material. The last is an important category, including typewriters, duplicators, paper, stencils, carbon, inks, radios, and radio parts. Arms and ammunition obviously must be strictly controlled, but the much more complicated control of food, clothing, and medical supplies entails

a detailed rationing system applied to the whole population plus control of movement of bulk stores from factory or source to retail shop. Bulk supplies of food and clothing materials must be moved in supervised convoys with a manifest system, and staple foods are issued only on presentation of ration cards. The control of medical supplies is an important task. They are vital to the guerrilla, particularly in a protracted struggle, and can be effectively controlled only by an elaborate system of certificates and accounting.

In general, a meticulously applied population and supply control is quite the best means of isolating the guerrilla. It does, as noted above, imply a satisfactory standard of local administration and access to the great majority of the population. It requires, furthermore, a considerable diversion of resources (in manpower in particular) and effective law enforcement by police and troops.

The Role of Intelligence

An effective and efficient intelligence organization is essential to a government facing an insurgency and is particularly important in the context of isolating the guerrilla from local support. Obviously, the whereabouts of the guerrilla forces must be known accurately for the purposes of military action, but his sources of local support must also be known in detail. But even before this it is desirable, if possible, to identify the individuals who comprise the guerrilla forces. This has always been the most difficult problem for the counterinsurgents, and no completely satisfactory intelligence solution has yet been produced.

Opinions differ on the best form of intelligence organization for those purposes, and, as our case studies show, there are variations according to the governmental structure of the country concerned. The alternatives are, broadly, a civil organization based on the existing police setup, and a military organization based on the armed forces. Having regard to the local nature of the intelligence requirements, it appears that the better alternative is usually one based on the civil police. If effective links are provided with the intelligence departments of the armed forces it is possible to meet most of the requirements. There is the additional advantage that a civil police intelligence system can be maintained on a local basis if, as is likely, military units move away from a particular area. In other words, continuity of information is ensured.

Intelligence requirements range from political information at one end of the scale to information of guerrilla force movements and strength at the other. The political aspect is vitally important in framing the government's psychological warfare plan and the propaganda to implement it. This is normally obtained by the technique of penetration, and the exploitation of all the normal sources such as informers, prisoners, captured documents, and intercepted messages. The requirements of the armed forces can be met by a combination of these and the normal military methods of reconnaissance in all its forms. An important factor here is the link-up between the two systems. An example is the British method developed in Malaya. The police obtained and collated the local intelligence, while the army, in addition to normal military intelligence functions, provided a number of officers attached to the police. These military intelligence officers worked within the police organization with the aim of extracting tactical information of value to the armed forces, and acting as a useful reinforcement to the police organization.

The main lesson is the need for cooperation between all gatherers of information and all users of information. There is always a tendency toward proliferation of intelligence organizations (there are said to be over 40 separate organizations operating in West Berlin today) and this must be firmly checked in any condition of insurgency. German operations against the various guerrilla forces in Occupied Europe in World War II were considerably handicapped by the competition between the the Abwehr, the SD, the Gestapo, and the various intelligence services of the puppet and satellite regimes.

Lastly there is the counterintelligence or counterespionage aspect. The part of the intelligence organization charged with this duty (preventing the enemy from gaining useful information) is obviously very important in any operations designed to isolate the guerrilla. Information is as necessary to success for him as are the other physical requirements provided by such local support as he enjoys. This has applied particularly in campaigns where terrorism has been a major factor, e.g., Ireland and Palestine, and has led sometimes to the creation of special counterterror organizations.

Part Two: The Guerrilla and External Support

CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

General

As clearly shown by our case studies, guerrillas have normally sought outside support in such forms as political, psychological, financial, military, and technical assistance. Usually these various types of external support have been intermixed.

Before the rise of communism, contacts between the guerrilla and the outside were usually unsystematized, sporadic, and fortuitous, as exemplified by the rather haphazard nature of British intervention in the Vendée in the late 18th Century. Since World War II, provision of outside support for Communist guerrillas has been systematic and based on a carefully worked out and time-tested doctrine. This is not to suggest that the Communist procedures and measures are necessarily institutionalized, and unquestionably there has been, and always will be, an element of improvisation. But the procedures and doctrine are sophisticated and coherent.

Political and social instability, economic distress, a general sympathy for the mystique of the guerrilla rebelling against the colonial overlord, all have combined to offer an environment and opportunities, here in greater degree, there in lesser, for relatively riskless aggression by international communism through sponsorship or exploitation of insurrection and guerrilla warfare.

The nuclear stalemate has interacted with world public opinion to facilitate this use of guerrilla warfare for aggressive purposes. The possibility of escalation of an internal war to general nuclear warfare has made sympathizers with the established government reluctant to strike directly at the external source of support of the insurgency. Meanwhile, world public opinion has accepted the passage of guerrillas across frontiers without the outcry that arises when conventional forces cross frontiers. At

least in part this is because the Free World (neutrals as well as Western powers) have been maneuvered through skillful use of psychological warfare into accepting a double standard of conduct for Communist and non-Communist powers.

From fear of escalation, pressure of world opinion, and inevitable uncertainty about the size and importance of outside support, has come the sanctuary principle.* In the Greek civil war, for instance, the Greek army did not attack into Albania or Yugoslav Macedonia, whence the guerrillas were drawing vital support. Nor, for their part, did the Yugoslav regular forces attack south into Greece, even when that country seemed shakiest. Such a direct attack might have prompted a vigorous Anglo-American response, perhaps even to start World War III. There was, of course, an analogous situation in the Korean War, when the UN forces refrained from attacking the Communist forces base of support in Manchuria, for fear of provoking Soviet intervention in the war. Similarly, during the Indochina War of 1945-1954, China was a sanctuary for the Viet Minh.

The idea of sanctuary has perhaps begun to erode somewhat in Southeast Asia, although probably only with respect to air operations. The weight of world opinion has accepted (though not without much protest) US aerial reprisals in North Vietnam and in Communist-controlled regions of Laos but would probably condemn movement of US ground troops into North Vietnam. No attacks have been made on the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, both of whom have been overtly aiding North Vietnam. Either power is capable of retaliation and effective self-defense; the appreciation that they would not retaliate for the attacks on North Vietnam was daring as well as perceptive. The United States was not willing to go that far during the Korean War--against a relatively major power. Yet it would appear that sanctuary is no longer quite as privileged as it was, at least so far as freedom from air attack is concerned. However, the United States has been careful not to undertake ground action into North Vietnam, although guarded threats of possible pursuit into Cambodia have been made.

*In some instances, e.g., Greece, the sanctuary has been facilitated by the vagaries of political frontiers that cut across ethnic groupings so that the rebel on one side might find, on the other side of the border, people allied to him by myriad social bonds, perhaps even those of clan or tribe.

The International System and Insurgency

The type of irregular warfare exposed in the background studies ranges all the way from skirmishes of the First Seminole War to the current war in Southeast Asia. Each example illustrates some form of guerrilla action, but the conditions that separate the cases are manifold. The Peninsular War, for example, was not primarily a guerrilla war in its chief aspects, but the types of outside intervention which occurred are hardly irrelevant to counterinsurgency. Equally relevant were the efforts of the Confederacy in the American Civil War to achieve legitimacy, legality, and foreign support.

A pure case of confined guerrilla war is unthinkable today. All internal conflicts, from their origin and often long before they have passed the threshold of violence, have had international dimensions. Although outside support has not necessarily been decisive, it has usually been important, and our historical examples suggest that in the 20th Century its application is inevitable. In manifold subtle ways guerrilla war is "internationalized" from the moment the first shots are fired. This is not simply a function of the Cold War and the predominantly bipolar structure of the international system, but is implicit in the idea of insurgency itself, in which insurgents are endeavoring at least partially to supplant the incumbents as a legal entity in the international system.

An insurgent movement begins from a position of relatively great disadvantage with respect to the legal government, and it cannot triumph until and unless its victory can somehow be accepted by the international system. This illustrates explicitly the need for outside support, both military and nonmilitary. There are abundant cases to show that moral, political, and psychological support from the world at large can assist a guerrilla movement immeasurably. A modern case in point would surely be the Algerian Revolution. Although defeated militarily in a conventional sense within Algeria, the FLN managed to enlist such diverse forms of international support that it was able to gain independence from France on July 7, 1962, after over seven years of armed struggle. Crucial to this victory, and related to this method, was the FLN's successful use of psychological warfare waged in part through intermediaries, to erode French will to pursue the conflict.

The ultimate career of an insurgent movement, starting from a position of enormous power disadvantage, has depended in great measure on its success in promoting the separation of the twin

concepts of legality and legitimacy, both internally and before other nations. Legality it cannot acquire unless by coup d'etat (which is not our concern) or unless anarchy or armed intervention ensue; legitimacy it can gradually come to possess if it operates with skill. Its primary international effort in the nonmilitary sphere has been directed toward securing as wide as possible an assent to its legitimacy first as a belligerent, and --through a progressive discrediting of the legal government-- as a de facto government. This has clearly been the aim of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam.

Conversely, the established government and its supporters will seek to prevent this outcome, but are likely to suffer from reciprocal disadvantages in their attempt. If the insurgents commence from a position of conspicuous weakness, they cannot help but gain strength, provided they maintain and expand their bases of local support and create emergencies for the forces of order. Each act of violence draws publicity. Each success breeds attention and respect. And a well-orchestrated propaganda program seeks to capitalize abroad on these successes. If all goes well, the aura of legitimacy will gradually commence to change camps. When the stage is sufficiently set, the insurgents feel powerful enough to establish a rival government in a guerrilla zone or on foreign soil, thereby inviting judgment of their own legality.

The problem of the legal government is vexing in the sense that after the insurgent succeeds in eliciting outside support, the government itself must seek compensating aid from the international market if it has not done so all along. This exposes it to the charge of being a front for foreign interests and tends to force it to demonstrate a lack of self-sufficiency and to mortgage a portion of its legitimacy. This has been one of the principal problems facing the beleaguered government of South Vietnam.

This is reason enough--from the incumbent's viewpoint--that guerrilla movements should be nipped in the bud. If a guerrilla movement has managed to acquire a certain international respectability, and hard outside commitments, it will have eluded the hazards of purely internal decision and will be implicated in the strategy and self-respect of the major powers and in the delicate balance of the international system. Every knowledgeable guerrilla leader seeks this kind of assurance.

Insurgency and Subversion

In the confused postwar backwash it has been possible for guerrilla movements to address themselves to a wide audience of international sympathizers, not only in the Communist bloc but in the Free World as well. Both the right of self-determination and the aspiration to social justice (professed by all modern insurgents) have an honored place in the Western treasury of values. And at least since the Bandung Conference of 1955 there has been an impressive solidarity among the new nations on this issue, if on little else. Thus the climate of the international system, despite its bipolarity, has been extremely favorable for the reception of insurgent legitimacy, especially when the guerrillas are attempting to expel a colonial power under the banner of self-determination.

This does not, however, alter the fact that most modern nationalist insurgents have seized upon the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine of revolutionary employment of guerrillas (because of its undoubted operational applicability) and, in the bargain, have tended to view the Western powers from the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist political-economic doctrine. Nor does it change the correlative fact that Communist-inspired and Communist-supported insurgencies have enjoyed the international benefits of their nationalist orientation as long as some pains were taken to conceal the red flag.

In the extraordinary chaos of the territorial revision of the last decades it has been inevitable that the strands of national liberation and social revolution would become interwoven with Marxist-Leninist theories and power drives in the underdeveloped world and easily confused in many quarters in the West. The history of Western political evolution and the vocation of many of the enlightened spirits of our civilization have pointed toward our endorsement of liberty for all peoples. Two case studies (Vol. III, pp. 1 and 145) have remarked on the support which both the American and Irish rebels received from a considerable segment of the British public and from the Whig and Liberal parties, respectively. Protests in favor of the insurgents in Malaya or the Greek Cypriots seem to follow in the same tradition, no less than the support given to the Vietnamese and Algerian revolutionaries by many French intellectuals, or the suspended attitude toward both Castro's Cuba and the Viet Cong that is or was widespread in Europe and Latin America.

While these confusions persist and are capitalized on by astute and vigorous insurgent propagandists, many individuals

continue to support Communist-aided or -inspired guerrilla movements, even while abhoring international communism. On the other hand, to ascribe to Moscow and Peking credit for manipulation of all nationalistic or socially progressive insurgencies is an oversimplification. Condemning all revolution out of hand merely intensifies the problem of assessing guerrilla movements objectively, and furnishes fuel to the propagandists of subversion.

It is not necessary to read the modern examples of insurgency explored in this study to recognize that international communism is dedicated to subversion, and that the rival Communist capitals, Moscow and Peking, are ideologically in concert on their objective to use subversion as elements of their programs aimed at the defeat of the West.

Subversion means two things and can work in two ways. It is the general environment (usually defined as being below the level of violence) in which a guerrilla movement takes shape and emerges, and it is the prescribed technique of intervention by which a major power, through the fomentation of social and political upheaval, seeks to sap the legitimacy of the government of a rival state. Often the two sides of subversion work together. For example, during World War II the Vietnamese Communists were able to capture leadership of the nationalist movement and use it later for a simultaneous war of independence and social revolution. In the case of other insurgencies, as in Algeria and Cyprus, the Communists were appreciated for their ability as rebel fighters, but kept at arm's length by the insurgent leaders.

Where subversion from the outside commands and precedes the outbreak of organized violence, it is obvious that the question of outside support has been raised even before the rifles bark. Past experience has shown that this is not always obvious at the time, however clear it becomes with hindsight. Modern revolutionaries, who do not care to sacrifice their slender chances at the outset, will take all possible care to conceal their indebtedness to foreigners with the object of solidifying nationalist sympathy within and international favor without. Ho Chi Minh did not formally request international recognition for his government--a move that cemented his Communist affiliations--until January 1950, after the Chinese Reds had reassuringly appeared on the Yunnan frontier. The remedy for this kind of deception--whose first overt appearance is usually in "national front" form--must lie in sophisticated spotting techniques and biographical knowledge of the various clandestine movements. Then, perhaps, the potential guerrillas can be isolated from their leaders and the leaders from misguided sectors of outside support.

If subversion is natively generated and the explosion of guerrilla violence takes a more purely nationalistic form, it is obvious from recent history that external subversion will not be long in seeking to introduce itself. Here, the procedures of inhibition will depend on the case in point. Possibly the insurgent leadership will not be anxious to allow this development and, like Nasser or Ferhat Abbas, will resist subversion while accepting support. The calculations of would-be supporters of the existing regime may have to be made on the spot in realistic terms involving multiple decisions.

We have pointed out that contemporary guerrilla movements, in striving to assert their legitimacy in the international community, have benefited quantitatively from the close and often opaque connection between the goals of independence and social revolution, and the cynical lip-service paid to both motives by totalitarian and aggressive communism. Today, however, the tide of anticolonialism is virtually at an end, at least insofar as the major Western powers are concerned. It thus becomes easier for the international audience to separate the two drives and judge accordingly. Leninist theory teaches that wars of independence in collaboration with the national bourgeoisie must ultimately be followed by Socialist revolution. But by no means all individuals, groups, or agencies--or all nations--that have willingly endorsed the struggle of guerrillas for self-determination will go to the extent of favoring complete destruction and reconstruction of the social order. The parties in power are not the obvious beneficiaries of ongoing revolution in the new nations; yesterday's insurgents are often today's statesmen; as evidenced by the Bourgibas, Nehrus, and Kenyattas.

Therefore, it should be theoretically possible to inhibit the outside support of future guerrilla movements on precisely these grounds. It should be easier to isolate and demonstrate the elements of conspiratorial subversion in the chaotic politics of the new nations, even though their characteristic instability makes for grave dangers.

The hope of the revolutionaries is of course to continue the profitable association with nationalism, to portray existing sovereign regimes as "neo-colonial," and to equate patriotism with social radicalism, especially in areas where economic and demographic pressures have become intolerable. Latent imperialism in some states and inevitable boundary conflicts help to fill out the strategy.

The first observation accounts somewhat for the current American preoccupation with Latin America as a center for mounting

guerrilla activity. Although sovereign for over a century, many of these states do not offer or have not until recently offered effective political participation or social justice to their people. Aside from the fact that they lie within a sensitive US sphere of influence, these cases seem earmarked as proving grounds for testing of the Communist axiom that revolution does not end with independence and that parliamentary regimes are a sham. Both the successes of reform and the elimination of insurgencies in this area can speak eloquently to those sectors which unreflectingly ascribe legitimacy to guerrilla movement, willy-nilly, and accept the broadest possible definition of "wars of liberation." Undoubtedly many of the present regimes of the new nations will also be watching this development, with a certain fear, but also opportunistically.

Our case studies suggest that in the near future socially radical or Communist guerrilla movements will arise in the underdeveloped nations with the pretense of stigmatizing the "nationalism" and "patriotism" of existing regimes. The theme of neocolonialism will be broadcast at large. This communication can be challenged, and outside political and psychological support inhibited, if the counterpropaganda can demonstrate that it is the guerrillas who are jeopardizing effective independence and latitude of national action. The reaction of other underdeveloped countries, both in their domestic policies and in their performance in international bodies, is apt to depend largely on the caliber of this response.

Insurgency and Western Opinion

Guerrillas frequently receive military hardware from the Communist bloc and mass enthusiasm from the new nations, but it is especially in the West and through the gaining of Western sympathies that they achieve legitimacy. As has been so clearly demonstrated in the United States recently, in varying degrees audiences such as intellectuals, labor leaders, entertainers, church groups, and students are often touched by the arguments guerrilla movements put forward. The cruelty and ineptitude of the existing regime are underscored; the Cromwellian purity and patriotism of the guerrillas are set against them. The guerrillas are righteous and representative. Sometimes all this is not far from being the case. But many fail to look beyond the genus guerrilla movement in making the assessment, and equate all popular uprisings.

What is not often realized is that a characteristic, fully articulated guerrilla movement (e.g., the FLN or the National Liberation Front) has easily as many external agents as it has officers on the field of combat. These persons are devoting full skill and time and conviction to cultivating hard support abroad and to changing attitudes wherever they will count. They may additionally be aided by local Communist parties and front groups. Their task is similar to that of forming a "popular front," and they are often remarkably successful.

For example, although many Americans, such as Senator John F. Kennedy in 1957, instinctively favored an independent Algeria, the FLN missions in this country and in the vicinity of the United Nations nevertheless performed salesmanship of high distinction. They succeeded in conveying the idea that this was a war of independence like our own. They capitalized skillfully on the torture and atrocity issues, publishing a voluminous white paper in English in 1960. And it is probably no accident that when French works about the Algerian war came to be translated here, the proportion was heavily weighted to the insurgent side, including several books by Communists.

In the meantime, El Moudjahid, the FLN's official weekly paper, was rampantly anti-American.

This same quality of propaganda efficiency will not necessarily be found in every guerrilla organization and its quest for outside support. Splits, differences of opinion, personal rivalries among guerrilla leaders are not unknown and offer opportunities to their opponents. In 1918-1919, Irish agents in the United States differed strongly among themselves and sought to hamper one another's activities. More recently, the two Israeli organizations, the Hagana and the Irgun Zevai Leumi were openly split after 1944.

Although it will probably not be possible in the West for Communist movements to ingratiate themselves as successfully as, say, the Irish or Israelis, here, too, the rules of the game are the same. How many moderate Americans have been happy to accept the suggestion that the Viet Cong is independent of Hanoi and that it is, in essence, a "national front" movement? How many French and British find the existence of the Castro regime very tolerable and absolutely unconnected with their own destinies?

These attitudes, insofar as they are innocent, are admirable examples of our plurality of opinion, of sympathy for the underdog, and related to a tradition of "objectivity" which refuses to see the world as black and white. But much is due also to a confusion

between endorsing independence for colonial areas and endorsing an aggressive nationalism, between endorsing social improvement in the poor areas of the globe and endorsing a severe and illiberal doctrine of social improvement whose progressive encroachments weaken the West.

Few of these attitudes, taken individually, are worth mentioning. But taken together they contribute to a climate of opinion in which policy becomes hamstrung. Nonintervention may be all the insurgents desire, and a government will be hard-pressed not to choose this solution if its public opinion is shaky. Of course, a government will act if it feels its own vital interests threatened, but it will be reluctant to act for an ally.

There is no possible Western world in which this kind of thing will not take place, nor would it be desirable that there were. The American people, in particular, have been profoundly and historically sympathetic to the self-determination of oppressed and subject peoples, identifying early American experience with theirs. But Western governments, and particularly that of the United States, seem to have fallen down somewhat in the task of educating their publics to the problems which insurgent war poses. Front groups, protests, marches, and manifestos cannot and should not be prevented in the United States, but it might seem that official voices could be raised to keep opinion leaders reminded that this is a difficult problem. The American government's careful and reasoned response to a segment of the academic community concerning the war in South Vietnam--largely through the efforts of respected academicians--may have been a milestone in this regard.

The Spectrum of Outside Nonmilitary Support

Extensive outside support has never been solely responsible for the triumph of a guerrilla movement, although it is often a component of that victory. In all probability significant outside support may not develop unless the guerrilla movement shows strength, durability, and mounting success. Otherwise, doubters will hesitate, liberal well-wishers will question the representativeness of the insurgents, and even friendly sponsoring powers will not wish to become gravely implicated.

If, then, a guerrilla movement has to demonstrate durability and stature before receiving significant amounts of outside aid, what procedures will it be likely to employ to solicit such aid?

On the whole--whatever its political doctrine or conspiratorial association--the movement will seek, at least at the outset, to appeal to as wide an audience as it can. Since there are many and diverse nations in the world, an insurgency will perforce tailor and diversify its propaganda so as to strike a chord with each disparate group it hopes to enlist for its cause.

Once it is well established, a typical modern guerrilla movement can count on Communist-bloc support in accordance with the "wars of liberation" principle, even if it is not itself Communist. Even when a guerrilla movement has been stimulated by Communist agents, it will usually have to prove both its seriousness as a catalyst for social upheaval and its nuisance value against the Free World before the support is overt. Conversely, it will have to estimate--in view of its geographical location and in view of the value Moscow or Peking sets on the area in which the conflict is taking place--how much effective support it can expect in return for inevitable concessions to bloc politics. Our examples suggest that if the area is tangent to the Communist bloc, serious arrangements can be expected, but presently (and particularly after the Cuban missile crisis) support is at best oblique and prudent if it is in Latin America or Central Africa. In general the Communists have tended to distribute their aid quietly (Moscow especially) until they are persuaded of backing a fairly sure thing. At this point, demonstrative propaganda and diplomatic recognition ensue.

Thus, the current guerrilla--whether he wants it or not--can expect the sympathy and at least the passive support of communism for his efforts. He can, however, anticipate being disowned or discredited if he commits serious errors--the worst of them being failure to solidify the allegiance of his own population.

Three other current restrictions on the automatic nature of Communist support to "wars of liberation" may be noted. In the first instance, the Communists may see greater international benefit in cultivating good relations with the regime (let us say, Nasser-type) against which the guerrillas have risen. Second, the Communists may balk at the final seizure of power by an insurgent group, feeling that it might produce unwanted Western intervention or perhaps lead to major war. Moscow's restraint of the Tudeh Party in Iran in the early 1950s is frequently cited in this connection. Third, there are the unfathomable ramifications of the Sino-Soviet split in third areas, leading presumably to a fragmentation of bloc policy wherever rival Communist movements oppose each other (the Dominican Republic and the war in Vietnam are timely examples of this situation).

Many revolutionaries have been roamers. Expelled from their homelands by political exile or by choice, they cultivated attachments in various parts of the globe which served their parties in good stead when they returned to take part in revolutionary uprisings. In the past the impact of these foreign contacts has been profound. Today, the situation is mixed. Self-determination (in one form or another) is a fact for much of the globe, and--with the conspicuous exception of the émigrés from Communist-dominated lands--colonies of exiles are no longer so conspicuous. The good old days of plotting in exile are perhaps past, but the age of subversion is in full rhythm. The problem persists.

Guerrilla warfare is the prerequisite and strength of the weak who would come to power, especially in a state where social and political solidarity is flimsy. Today, the colonial period has practically ended, and guerrilla movements are increasingly less able to associate their cause with the imperative of independence. Nevertheless, in the authoritarian and oligarchic sovereign states that remain, there is abundant mileage to be gained from social justice issues. Insurgent guerrillas (as well as revolutionaries who have thus far avoided violence) will manage to associate this appeal with attack on the patriotism and nationalism of the regime they oppose. A classic example is Castro's campaign against Batista, where a majority of the Cuban people and outside observers came to doubt seriously whether the dictator really had Cuban interests at heart. Consequently, it is easy to see why guerrilla movements may continue to find exceptional support and strength in wide areas of the underdeveloped world.

However, the prospects have changed somewhat. "Wars of liberation" are no longer necessarily "wars of independence." Responsible rulers in newly independent states recognize--perhaps from their own experience--that guerrilla insurgency is a spreading contagion, and that he who speaks in praise of revolution elsewhere is likely to be one of its next victims.

In the past, as we have noted, there was an almost unbroken solidarity among the new nations in favor of active insurgencies. The bond of new nationalism was so potent that political dogma became a very secondary criterion. Carefully correct felicitations were frequently exchanged between the leaders of various insurgent movements. This attitude was endorsed at Bandung, where numerous resolutions were carried in favor of budding colonial uprisings, including the Algerian. Provisional governments were invited to "third world" conferences. Even if the political leadership of a given country might be wary of too activist a commitment to such regimes, both internal and diplomatic pressures and the whole mystique of new nationhood were generally decisive.

It was the disruption in the Congo in 1960 which really cracked this solidarity, although intimations of Afro-Asian discord had sometimes boiled up over the Arab-Israeli dispute. The farsighted action of France in summarily freeing her Black African colonies at a time when she could have confidence in their existing leadership was influential in assuring substantial pro-Western sentiment in Africa, and this has affected the stance of the entire neutral world. With the issue of independence largely passed by, the "third world" does not automatically endorse any given guerrilla movement. The ruling elites of underdeveloped countries have a general interest in global stability and legitimacy.

The increasing social differentiation of these countries, however, as well as traditional ethnic and religious divisions, pose dangers for the future. Here is not only fertile ground for subversion, but potential support for revolutionary upheaval in other areas, provided that the elements so affected (e.g., labor unions, professionals, intellectuals, students) are in a position to contribute positive support.

With respect to inhibiting nonmilitary support for guerrilla movements in countries of the uncommitted and underdeveloped world, a first dictate would seem to be political and diplomatic: break down the solidarity of the bloc so that virtual unanimity, even on sensitive issues, becomes less customary. A second useful policy is encouragement of contacts and exchanges with underdeveloped nations friendly to the West. A third, as we have mentioned, is the skillful separation of the themes of nationalism and social revolution in the evolution of the "third world"; they have been closely linked up to this date. A fourth is, of course, the patient exercise of power and realism, letting deeds speak when they have something to say.

While an efficient insurgent movement will distribute its propaganda activities in all major countries and may indeed establish foreign headquarters in certain of them (as the FLN did in West Germany), its most thorough action will be concentrated in that major country which is most heavily involved in the support of its incumbent opponent, or in the proprietary country if it is an anticolonial uprising. The reasons for this are obvious: any short-circuit that can be effected in the public trend of thought will have direct repercussions on the course of the conflict. Thus, while it is very useful to the Viet Cong to render America's role in Southeast Asia unpopular with Europeans, the benefits will be much greater if American opinion itself can be influenced against its government's declared policies.

There are, of course, more specialized solicitations of support among discrete professional, ethnic, and religious groups. Spontaneously, the Islamic world is touched when a Muslim revolts; automatically, the feelings of a man of color will go out to non-Caucasian insurgents; many lawyers will bristle at breaches of international jurisprudence; students will sympathize with rebel students; men of religion will bridle at vivid accounts of indecent cruelty. The insurgent propagandist has all these stops to play on. Moreover, instantaneous psychological reactions are not easily dispelled by cold war logic.

Concerning international organizations, three special instances command our attention. The first is the international Communist movement, which, as a transmission belt, as a supplier of funds, or as a procurer of information is a worthy instrument for any who have access to its resources. The second is the United Nations, which, as a platform for insurgencies and their sponsors, has been extremely influential on more than one occasion. The Tunisian demand for independence, pressed in 1952 and 1953 and actually brought to a favorable vote (instructing France to settle the issue in line with the principle of self-determination) in the latter year, did much to hasten the transfer of sovereignty. And with Greece as spokesman in 1957, the Greek Cypriots were able to obtain a favorable UN vote regarding their aspirations (although they had to sacrifice enosis for independence). Finally, there is the special case of the Arab League, which, with its funds, diplomatic pressures, channels of communication, Maghreb bureaus, and general good offices, played a large role in organizing and supporting the rebel movements in the three French North African states.

The primary quests of an insurgency are for power and legitimacy. The first is won by force of arms in a guerrilla-type combat which may, at its culmination, develop into a classical war of mobility. Here, outside military aid may be of the essence. But the second is won through varieties of agitation, propaganda, and persuasion. The relation between the two techniques is obvious, and both are commonly present and synchronized in an effective modern insurgency such as that in Vietnam today.

The New Colonialism

In summation, it is readily demonstrable that, since World War II, insurgency has become an instrument of colonialism operating under the guise of "liberation." A sharp line of demarcation may be discerned between most instances of insurgency (and

its supporting irregular warfare) today and that of the preceding 125 years or so. The historical record, which is before us in the basic papers as well as in an immense germane literature, shows that guerrillas in the past usually sought outside aid, but rarely obtained it save when they themselves were able to provide useful support to the regular forces of a power engaged in conventional conflict with a common enemy.

Moral support often has gone to insurgents, but with relatively little palpable effect, since its expression in military or other overt action would have led to war. Sympathy for the Boers, the Filipinos (1898-1913), the Ethiopians (1935-1936), the Spanish "Republicans" (1936-1939), to cite a few examples, was widespread but generally ineffectual. The United States had to go to war with Spain in 1898 in order to render effective support to Cuban insurgents.

Financial and material support has been occasionally afforded --but usually without substantial benefit to the guerrillas, and sometimes to the ultimate disadvantage of those affording support. Thus, British financial aid to Spain in the Napoleonic Wars went to the Junta, and relatively little ever reached the guerrillas doing the fighting. Allied support in World War II was freely given to Tito's guerrillas rather than to those of Mihailovic, with the result that Yugoslavia was lost to communism, a loss that was not necessarily inevitable.

The United States is therefore faced with a new set of facts and conditions in insurgent guerrilla warfare affecting our interests. These must not only be recognized; we must adjust to them. The methods which defeated Aguinaldo, and the conditions surrounding his insurgency, are only partially comparable with those which relate to Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Cong.

CHAPTER IV. NONMILITARY ASPECTS OF ISOLATION

FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT

The International Environment

Prior to World War II the characteristic system of European diplomacy had for centuries been multipolar, that is to say, based on a plurality of leading members, none of which was clearly preponderant over the others or could become so; the regulatory device was the balance of power. Since 1945, however, we have experienced a bipolarity based on the preponderant power of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the nuclear stalemate between them.

The incidence of nuclear weapons and the powerful trend of decolonization have simultaneously produced a situation in which relative prudence and piecemeal tactics are appropriate in the exercise of power, even by the superstates. This condition, as we have seen, has furnished a wide field for politico-military subversion. Overt war is increasingly dangerous, and so those who would change the status quo have found that use of the entire sphere of irregular, subversive activity to promote relatively gradual change is not only promising but requisite. A major and sudden loss for one side will result in a glittering gain for the other and possibly compel escalating or apocalyptic reprisal. The surer method is to advance obliquely and gradually, wherever possible by proxy, utilizing all the excuses and possibilities of legitimacy which the consensual attitudes of the international system confer.

This has been the atmosphere in which the general problem of denying outside support to the revisionist guerrilla must be understood. One cannot attack the problem by seeking vainly to alter the propensities of the international system, but unless one understands the system as it operates, accepting its rules, one may very well go astray in seeking a solution.

There is also the matter of ideology, expressed in the notion of patterns of a "heterogeneous system." Although it is dangerous to subscribe to the notion that the so-called Communist and capitalist worlds are drawing closer together; it may not be foolish to speculate that the multiplication of "revisionisms" might have the effect of reducing the power of revisionism per se in the world. And the present trend is toward particularization and diffusion. Heterogeneity in a more frankly multipower world may beget less dangerous subversions, and it should increase the spectrum of means by which the insurgent search for outside support can be countered--propagandistically, diplomatically, and physically.

Limiting Factors of Insurgent Success

The wide spectrum of techniques available to a modern guerrilla movement for gaining international support has already been noted. But the limiting features should be clearly understood and utilized by an opponent. They can be expressed briefly as follows:

1. Preparation. The serious preparation of a guerrilla uprising by such means as internal subversion, training of cadres, precommitment of outside support, creation of invulnerable bases, and establishment of channels of communications, contributes heavily to ultimate success. Countermeasures should envisage the exploration and exploitation of any known weaknesses in the guerrilla's range of preparation.
2. Duration. The capacity for a guerrilla movement to persist and grow not only suggests to the outside world that the movement is being successful, but by the very fact of duration allows for the multiplication and permanent implantation of useful channels to the outside. In this regard time is usually on the side of the insurgent. Disruptions in the rhythm of the conflict, however, may cause him serious trouble, especially if his contacts with the outside are not solidly assured.* Even a diplomatic crisis short of increased intervention or escalation might serve this purpose.

*In some instances, of course, hard-pressed insurgents may welcome a disruption or interruption of a conflict that is not going well, particularly if this can be accomplished on relatively favorable terms. Thus the IRA in Ireland was happy to accept a truce when it was at the end of its resources.

3. Technology. At the outset of an insurgent movement, the guerrillas must usually fight with limited and simple weapons. While this does not in itself put them at a serious disadvantage, they may suffer severely from technological weaknesses in other respects. In particular, the efforts of an insurgency's external organization to gain outside support will depend in large part on the modernity and sophistication of its operation. This is particularly true in such matters as propaganda techniques and economic planning. Sophistication and modern technology can be, and often have been, provided by Communist sponsors, as in both North and South Vietnam in the current war.

4. Proximity. It has been pointed out time and again that one of the critical elements in the success of guerrilla movements has been the accessibility of the territory of a friendly power--for supply, training, restaging, and moral support. Although this point is not so obvious in the case of nonmilitary aid, it is nevertheless of great importance. Insurgencies thrive on publicity, and it is much harder for timely publicity to emerge from the combat zone if the word cannot be sent out through friendly territory close at hand. Similarly, the whole problem of outward communication that a modern guerrilla movement needs is rendered much more precarious.

5. Leadership. Sound leadership is critical in all phases of a guerrilla operation, and insurgent movements founder for the lack of it. But dynamic leadership also provides a catalytic and charismatic effect within and a propagandistic effect without. It is easier for a guerrilla movement to arrest attention abroad if that movement is firmly associated in people's minds with a popular and skillful leader. For instance, Castro's cigar, beard, and fatigues did much to collect sympathy for his movement abroad, as did Ho Chi Minh's ascetic physiognomy and cultured bearing. It is good politics for an insurgency to have an interesting face to present to the international public. Conversely, if the leader can be attacked and unmasked directly by counterpropaganda, or is captured or killed, the cause of the rebellion may suffer.

6. Decision-making skill. In an average insurgency, skill at making decisions is customarily also an attribute of leadership, although certain decisions may be entrusted to collective bodies, of which, for example, the FLN in time came to possess several. Brilliance and timeliness of decision-making will tend to allow an insurgency to capitalize on all the techniques mentioned here, within the measure of its means. Persistent failure will usually lead to liquidations and reorganizations. However, there are certain inherent weaknesses of decision-making

in any guerrilla operation. One of the most conspicuous derives from the fact that decisions have to be made both inside and outside the combat area, and that the internal and external organizations--especially if their communications are attenuated and difficult--may come into conflict. The opponent should be prepared to research and exploit these differences when they occur and to cast all possible doubt on the representatives of a movement's external agents, to create suspicions that they are freebooters incapable of speaking officially for the movement. Difficulties of this sort, if they can be created, may also spill back upon the internal organization and affect its morale. This has been attempted by the Americans and South Vietnamese with respect to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, but our case study would suggest the effort has not yet had discernible success.

7. Solidarity. Part of a guerrilla movement's capacity to elicit outside sympathy and support depends upon its pretension of representing a united popular will at home. The established government will therefore seek mercilessly to destroy this image by exploiting all flaws that appear. These are most apt to emerge in the conflict of the external and internal organizations, between an insurgent movement and its acknowledged outside support, in the context of relations with potentially friendly states, and in clashes of personality. All possibilities of this sort should be carefully considered. Furthermore, guerrillas themselves--if often chauvinistically attached to the idea of their own heroic community--need to be constantly reassured that they are not an island in a hostile world. Ho Chi Minh incessantly told his people: "The reactionary colonialists' aggressive war is unjust and hated by everyone. Our resistance for national salvation is a just war, therefore it is receiving the support of many people. The majority of the French people want to live in peace and friendship. The peoples of the colonies sympathize with us. The Asian peoples support us. Public opinion all over the world approves us." (Speech of July 19, 1947.) It is this image of solidarity which must be attacked, within and without, by exploitation of error and use of fact, reciprocally, if the guerrilla is to be weakened.

Outside Political Support and Countermeasures

In our consideration of countermeasures against outside political support, we are construing the word "political" in the more restricted and traditional sense of "diplomatic," or the area covering international relations.

As we have insisted, the external representatives of an insurgent movement have a fundamental objective: to impress the legitimacy of their movement on as wide as possible a sector of the international community through persuasion and demonstration. They will stress the popularity and representativeness of their faction, and the corruption and repressiveness of the regime they are opposing. They will play the "underdog" role for all it is worth in the proper quarters, but in diplomatic milieu where power talks, they will insist on their growing strength and invincibility. They will attempt to prove that they have a healthier respect for international legality than their opponents. They will evoke historical precedent in their favor, especially if colonialism is the issue, to prove the continuity of the nation and their right to speak for it in its present form. If, by chance, certain of their leaders have already fulfilled state functions or if (as in the case of Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno, and others) the case can be made that they have already been the tenants of a legitimate state, this point will be pressed home. They will, as suggested earlier, make every effort to affect public opinion in those countries where government policy is hesitant. And they will seek, at a certain point in their evolution, to gain admittance to regional and international councils and conferences for the sake of further augmenting their legitimacy.

These tactics, if skillfully pursued, should contribute to the expansion of outside diplomatic support, implicit and explicit, and--what is just as important--to the attrition of the material and moral resources of the incumbent regime. After all, the incumbents have started with recognized sovereignty in the eyes of the world community and the legal right to request and receive aid and intervention. Any denial of this primary power is an absolute gain for the insurgency.

In the diplomatic arena, two hurdles are apt to be of special importance. The first is the struggle toward the acquisition of legitimate belligerent rights for the insurgents, which, if granted, effectively "internationalizes" the war and promotes the tacit admission that there are two legitimate centers of sovereignty in conflict. The second is the formation of a provisional government and the request for official diplomatic recognition from outside powers. The first condition will be achieved gradually and brought about by the evolution of the conflict; once it is achieved de facto, the insurgents will have gained potent political ammunition. In their quest for this aspect of legitimacy they are likely to play on such sensitive themes as the rules of war and the Geneva Convention concerning prisoners, as the Algerians did with such skill; and as the Viet Cong has done in the case of American and South Vietnamese use of tear gas. The

government will be tempted to rebuff such a challenge, but if it is accepted, it will automatically grant a kind of legitimacy to the insurgent.

As for establishment of a provisional government, and the quest for diplomatic recognition, the insurgency will usually wish to take the step at a moment when military events contribute to the impact or when it is willing to run the risk of offending or inhibiting certain kinds of support to make gains elsewhere. This action tends to polarize the conflict by lining up the official international community on one side or the other. It promotes dangers as well as benefits for an insurgent movement, but it is an inevitable step along the path of legitimacy.

These insurgent diplomatic efforts will usually first be directed toward influential nongovernmental bodies, such as international labor, youth and professional congresses, ad hoc conferences, and the like.

The countermeasures to these tactics are not easy to pinpoint since the exact possibilities will depend upon the political character of the insurgency, its impact on the major actors of the system, the relations of the major actors with each other, and a variety of other political factors. Basically, however, the indicated responses may be divided into the following categories:

1. Rebuttal of insurgent pretensions to legitimacy.
2. Diplomatic pressures to prevent the piecemeal surrender of attributes of legitimacy by the established government. (This does not necessarily preclude granting limited belligerent rights to the insurgents, if required; this is a separate issue.)
3. Achievement of alliance solidarity in support of the legitimacy and legality of the established government.
4. Diplomatic bargaining with would-be insurgent supporters to insure their neutrality in return for counterconcessions.
5. Anticipation and disruption of major insurgent moves in the diplomatic sphere.
6. Internal diversionary or retaliatory acts against the insurgents to offset or minimize insurgent gains.
7. Mobilization of international bodies to reject insurgent pretensions.

Exploitation of Communist Weaknesses

Undoubtedly it is most difficult for supporters of an incumbent regime to interfere effectively with both the channels and circumstances of outside support to a guerrilla movement by the Communist bloc. However, there are certain propensities in Communist outside support that can possibly, under the best of circumstances, be exploited:

1. Moscow may be in a mood today to limit given instances of guerrilla support, especially if they occur in areas where China, rather than the Soviet Union, is dominant in subversion. There are also asymmetrical but feasible quid pro quos that might be offered to Moscow in this connection. At least Soviet support may possibly be rendered desultory and mechanical.

2. In the face of the Sino-Soviet disturbance it may become increasingly possible to disrupt the fidelity of communications between the guerrilla movements and the Communist centers. Suspicion can enter where solidarity previously was the rule. An excellent example of the exploitation of inter-Communist difficulties was in Greece, where the KKE was split internally, while the Tito-Stalin rift finally closed the border.

3. With the breakup of European colonial empires almost completed, and the establishment of numerous uncommitted governments throughout the underdeveloped world, frankly Communist-identified insurgencies may become less plausible. Consequently, the techniques of overt support to guerrillas by the Communist bloc may become more difficult, indeed less profitable.

4. Any sequence of failures in which the Communist nations are implicated may have a cumulative deterrent effect on future actions.

Outside Psychological Support and Countermeasures

The psychological factor in guerrilla warfare is two-sided. On the one hand, the insurgent makes strenuous efforts to convey the successes of the internal movement to the outside world, and, on the other, he is feeding back to his combat forces the record of sympathy and support elicited abroad. The two processes go hand-in-hand, and it is logical to assume that the established government will seek the disruption of both, parlaying victories in one sphere into the other, just as the insurgent has been doing.

Effective propaganda requires a combination of skillful presentation, adequate technology, and understanding of audiences. This is no less true for the established government than for the insurgent. In the most recent examples we have studied, both parties have employed a wide range of propaganda and counterpropaganda addressed to a variety of audiences.

The guerrilla thrives on certain well-tested themes, which must somehow be countered by his opponent: David vs. Goliath, purity vs. corruption, honor vs. treachery, poor vs. rich, generous vs. profiteering, etc. In addition to this general picture of good vs. evil, there are other refrains. The government is guilty of atrocity (torture, germ-warfare, rapes, and civil violence). The government is conceited and dissolute. The government is a henchman of greedy powers. The people have never been allowed free choice. The minority which rules is antipopular and antipatriotic. The revolutionary brings laws and justice; the incumbent is cruel and arbitrary. And so forth. If "independence" can be added to this battery of charges, the more powerful the magic.

It will be noted to what a remarkable degree insurgent propaganda seizes particular incidents and builds them up into a general cause célèbre. This is a device by which the Communists have profited for decades, and are exploiting to the hilt today in Vietnam. Should an innocent woman or child be killed in the course of a manifestation, a village search, or a skirmish, the incident will not go unpublicized. The execution of a single Greek guerrilla in the civil war of 1947-1949 elicited both a drawing by Picasso and a poem by Paul Eluard.

All these techniques have their serious repercussions in the outside world if assisted by wide and effective channels of transmission.

At the same time external guerrilla propaganda reveals an interesting dichotomy. On the one hand, it stresses the cruelty and injustice of its opponent and the sufferings imposed on the people; on the other, it spares no effort to represent the incumbent as essentially weak and cowardly, on the run before the indignant might of decent world opinion, a "paper tiger." The problem for the incumbent and his supporters is to turn the equation around: to show justice as the accompaniment of strength and to equate the weakness of the guerrilla with the need for deceit.

The question of psychological support is a big issue. From the cases studied in support of this report we can deduce a few guidelines to inhibit the insurgent's propaganda tactics and to appeal to the likely audiences.

1. The government must accept the insurgent's choice of audiences, including an assessment of what he has to gain from each, and must develop positive propaganda for direction toward the same audience.

2. The government, instead of wasting valuable energy in logical refutation of insurgent claims, should practice many of the same techniques that are causing him trouble. We have found no evidence that this was done systematically in any of our examples.

3. Individual guerrilla atrocities and gaucheries should be systematically reported and emphasized.

4. Orchestrated attacks on the personal conduct or past biography of guerrilla leaders can pay dividends, since public opinion tends to associate the respectability of movements with the behavior of the leadership.

5. Any refutation of guerrilla propaganda that effectively contests its legitimacy is especially valuable.

6. External failures of insurgent activity or schismatic developments among supporting powers should be skillfully and fully reported by leaflet, whispering campaign, or broadcast to the combat zones and internal areas of support.

7. Splits in the guerrilla organization for outside support can be exploited. Simulated propaganda of one faction against another, publicizing the split, covert aid to dissident elements, are a few of the many devices that can be used to profit by such a situation.

8. In short, in the allotment of time and energy to psychological countermeasures, more attack and less defense is probably indicated. This does not ignore the fact that systematic refutations will have to be made, especially where sophisticated and fundamentally open-minded audiences are involved.

Outside Economic Support and Countermeasures

Money is the life's blood of the modern guerrilla movement, and to the extent that funds and resources are not obtained internally through seizure, intimidation, or voluntary contribution, they must come from the outside. Well-organized channels of

finance, set on foot in advance of the outbreak of actual guerrilla combat, can immeasurably simplify the task of an insurgency and reduce the duration of its struggle. In general, if there is no friendly border or if air and other communications are severely interdicted by the forces of order, food and small arms and ammunition supplies for the guerrilla must be assured from the inside. Outside funds will be useful, however, to cover external agitation, diplomatic activity, bribery, and the inevitable large purchases of sophisticated arms, medical supplies, and ancillary equipment that will hopefully be introduced as the struggle progresses more favorably. The anomaly is that, not only have modern guerrilla movements been successful in securing large financial resources from sympathetic powers, but that, owing to the very structure of free enterprise on which the capitalist world prides itself, they have managed to deal profitably and privately in Western countries without undue difficulty. In the absence of restrictive legislation, business is always business.

The following have been promising economic targets for typical, well-developed guerrilla movements:

- A. Friendly governments.
- B. Conationalists in foreign countries, who are sympathetic or forced to contribute through intimidation (the remarkable success of the FLN in collecting funds from the 400,000 Algerians in metropolitan France is to be recalled in this regard, as is the ability of the Chinese Communists to obtain contributions from overseas Chinese).
- C. Speculators, who regard the future prospects of extensive dealings with a guerrilla-movement-come-to-power as very attractive.
- D. Nonofficial bodies which have a stake in the outcome of the conflict, such as the AFL-CIO in North Africa, which desired an influence over the Maghrebian labor unions.
- E. Commercial and shipping profiteers with little political interest in the conflict.
- F. Governments, government agencies, and economic concerns under their influence that perceived an opportunity to expand their economic markets at the expense of competitors who were restrained for political reasons.
- G. "Front" groups susceptible to raising contributions for humanitarian reasons.

Provided that a nation supporting the incumbent regime desires to take steps to inhibit the flow of funds to the guerrillas, the following measures, ranging from least to most Draconian, may be available:

1. Public indications of support for the incumbent regime.
2. Voluntary requests to all nationals to refrain from guerrilla supply, and public blacklisting of intermediary "dummy" agencies.
3. Close surveillance and (to the extent possible) police supervision of suspected insurgent agents, their environment, and their contacts, both at home and abroad.
4. Diplomatic requests to friendly powers to impose similar restrictions.
5. Selective supervision of currency outflow and requests to friendly powers to do the same.
6. Assignment of sanctions to all individuals and firms doing business with the insurgents.
7. Passage of criminal legislation to the same end.
8. Refusal of national waters and harbor facilities to hulls known to have carried supplies for transshipment to the insurgents.
9. Graduated diplomatic threats to other powers permitting or having commerce with the insurgents.
10. Imposition of sanctions on foreign suppliers.
11. Asymmetrical economic or other retaliation or punishment for noncompliance.
12. Physical interdiction of insurgent supply through blockade, search, and seizure.

It must be recognized, however, that the less severe remedies are not likely successfully to staunch the flow of the more subtle forms of economic support, and that the harsher measures will usually seem self-defeating. Although the United States is not pleased that Canada and the Western European powers trade with Cuba, it has not been willing to pass beyond official protest. Furthermore, even domestic legislation regulating foreign commerce will never be airtight, and in the most democratic countries it will be subject to review in the courts. The gloomy conclusion

is that in a free country, and especially in a free-enterprise country, economic support is elusive and difficult to inhibit unless real public feeling can be developed to deter it.*

There are three basic gradations of technique that a government can employ with regard to its own nationals: education, persuasion, and penalization. With regard to others, we have suggested a gamut of diplomatic pressures, none of which is likely to bring satisfaction unless the other government sees its interest in the same light. Past evidence seems to suggest that these matters are best dealt with in a quiet, bilateral fashion and not under the glare of publicity that accompanies the meetings of such organizations as NATO and the OAS.

Summation

The success of an insurgency in gaining the moral, psychological, political, and economic commitments which it needs from the outside will be directly related to its ability to exploit the characteristic tolerances of the international system. Attempted countermeasures that lose sight of this fact will probably fail.

The fundamental quest of the insurgent for nonmilitary support abroad revolves decisively around his need to cultivate the aura of legitimacy. This provides a point of attack for those attempting to disrupt this activity.

*See also the extensive and relevant materials regarding economic assistance to participants in the Spanish Civil War.

CHAPTER V. MILITARY ASPECTS OF ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT

General

The simplest manifestation of guerrilla warfare--such as in the resistance of the American Indians or the Naga tribes of India--is the response of primitive peoples to encroachments by a more advanced civilization. On a more sophisticated level, the measures taken by a revolutionary government against religion and against a traditional way of life unleashed the resistance in the Vendée. Later, the Napoleonic armies, which lived off the country, forced the Russian peasants to resort to guerrilla warfare, in large part because of the food shortage the military exactions provoked, although nationalism played some part. Concurrently, an aspect of ideology, in the form of simple national patriotism, was evident in the peasant struggles, in Spain and in the Tyrol. The importance of the respective roles played by hunger, hatred of the foreigner, attachment to native folkways, nationalism, and other manifestations of ideology cannot be precisely measured.

Outside support has not been necessary at the start of a guerrilla insurrection, though it has obviously helped when available. Moreover, guerrilla warfare alone has rarely defeated the regular army of a well-established government. To achieve decisive results the guerrilla must in the end, as we have noted, obtain external support to create a counteradministration and a counterstate.

Transborder Sanctuary

One of the basic forms of external support is the availability of transborder sanctuary. Sometimes, this is available by default, simply because the neighboring government's authority does not extend into the border region. A classic case of this nature existed along the US-Mexican border between 1850-1890.

For three-quarters of a century after the Mexican War the border region remained a half-explored wilderness, the domicile of Indian tribes still unsubdued by either country (Vol. III, p. 55). The Indians committed depredations in one country and took refuge in the other. They recognized no boundary, but knew that once across the Rio Grande they were fairly safe from pursuit. In the years immediately after the Civil War the worst offenders were the Kickapoos, a small but warlike tribe which had migrated south during the 1860s, and settled in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, about 40 miles below the Rio Grande. Regarded with favor by the local authorities and population, the Kickapoos behaved peacefully in Mexico and their loot brought from the United States contributed to the prosperity of the area. Because of their depredations the US Government repeatedly attempted in vain to have the tribe returned to its jurisdiction.

After a series of reprisal raids by US forces, undertaken despite Mexican protests, the Kickapoos were returned to US control in 1875. The stabilization of settlement in Texas and improved Texas police forces deterred further Indian raids in this region.

In the 1870s the problem shifted westward to New Mexico and Arizona where the Apaches presented the main menace. After committing their depredations, the Apaches usually sought refuge in the Sierra Madre mountains of Chihuahua and Sonora. But since the Apaches attacked Mexicans as well as Americans, they were not protected by the Mexican authorities. Indeed, in 1882 both governments reached an agreement by which troops of either country could cross the international boundary in close pursuit of hostile Indians. The agreement, periodically renewed, worked tolerably well and though the Apaches were not completely subdued until the 1890s, it ended the problem of transborder sanctuary.

Similar problems of transborder sanctuary for raiding tribesmen were encountered during the course of European colonial expansion in Africa and Asia. From Algeria, the French mounted repeated punitive expeditions into Tunisia and Morocco, virtually annexing both countries eventually. Similar problems plagued the British Northwest Frontier in India as well as the Burmese border areas (Vol. II, p. 21). Foreign support of recalcitrant tribesmen, either by adjoining native states or by rival colonial powers, was sometimes a factor. In the case of the colonial rivalries, diplomatic means, backed by a show of naval and military force, sufficed; in the case of the native states eventual occupation of the base of external support was often resorted to. Generally, the superior organization and

technology, both civil and military, of the colonial power reduced the problem of tribal raiding to a bandit nuisance. There were three major exceptions between the World Wars. From 1920 to 1925 the Riffis under Abd el Krim nearly drove Spain and France out of northeastern Morocco; at about the same time the Druzes were seriously threatening French control of Syria; and in the 1920s and 1930s there was a revival of fighting on the Northwest Frontier in India. It is noteworthy that Abd el Krim employed some foreign experts and received some support from anti-French elements in England.

Direct External Support

More difficult than dealing with simple tribal raidings, or even primitive native uprisings aided by essentially free-lance technicians, is the case when guerrillas receive systematic support of a foreign nation or nations. Here, two basic situations have existed.

The first has been when a hostile state has deliberately fomented guerrilla warfare in another state to put pressure on the victim and to impress the friends of the victim with the earnest of its hostile intentions. Thus Sudeten German leaders on Hitler's orders engaged in a brief show of incursions, by a Sudeten Freicorps into Czechoslovakia; more recently President Sukarno introduced guerrilla warfare, first against Dutch New Guinea, and later against Malaysia. On the other hand, a short terrorist campaign waged by Austrian Nazis, on orders from Berlin, failed in 1934 under the pressure of an Italian military counterdemonstration. But this type of operation is essentially political-diplomatic and an accessory to the overall political picture.

The second type of external guerrilla support is more significant. It consists of external support for guerrilla operations which may or may not be revolutionary. During World War II in Western Europe the Resistance was not revolutionary (that is in opposition to the established regime) where it was approved or inspired by the legal government in exile. It was semirevolutionary in France, where it opposed Vichy. In Eastern Europe (except for Russia) the Resistance sometimes began as a nonrevolutionary movement, but soon was captured by revolutionary forces. This was particularly true in the Far East, where the few effective Resistance movements were particularly susceptible to anticolonial revolutionary slogans. In both China and Vietnam

the revolutionary aim also overshadowed the resistance to the foreign invader theme very early. The pure type of revolutionary guerrilla warfare was that in Ireland, Israel, and Cyprus.

To deal with this type of external support for an existing insurgency (whether or not revolutionary in nature) represents a much more serious military problem than dealing with the old style of marginal tribal guerrilla warfare.

Answering the challenge of transborder guerrilla support with reprisal raids and strikes against the support bases has historic precedents. In the 16th Century guerrilla warfare against adjoining Christian states was a deliberate part of Ottoman strategy. Unable to commit its regular forces for extended periods, the Porte relied on a large irregular border establishment to keep up pressure. This was countered by Hapsburgs and Romanoffs by special border forces and counterraids. The danger in this was that such reprisal raids could, and often did, escalate into full-scale war. In full-scale war, guerrillas become auxiliaries of the main army and strikes against their bases become part of the normal overall conduct of war. There are, however, complications. When Napoleon attempted to eliminate Turkish bases in Palestine, which supported guerrilla warfare against the French in Egypt, he merely extended his commitments without gaining the desired result. And when the counterinsurgent tries to interfere with neutral countries whence supplies come to guerrillas he may well consolidate neutral feeling against him. This, at least, was the experience of the British during the Revolutionary War (Vol. III, p. 1).

In the 20th Century guerrillas often receive external support from countries ostensibly nonbelligerent. Reprisal raids against foreign bases where the guerrillas receive training, recuperate, and return to their zone of operations have been avoided, even before the complications of nuclear deterrence and stalemate emerged. For instance, the United States, Britain, and Greece carefully avoided any action against transborder guerrilla bases during the Greek civil war (Vol. II, p. 173). The United States also condemned Israeli reprisal against fedayin bases as well as the French air attacks (during the Algerian War) on Tunisian border villages, such as the operation against Salkiet in February 1958.

Modern opposition to such transborder actions appears to be based on three main considerations. For one, such actions have in the past been used as pretexts for aggression; second, they may be ineffective unless launched on a sufficiently large scale;

third, they are potentially escalatory in the nuclear age. If raids are on a small scale, diplomatic complications and unfavorable effects on neutral public opinion may well outweigh any advantage. In the case of the current US aerial operations against North Vietnam it may be doubted if Communist leaders believe that the United States has expansionist intent, although the operations are on a scale large enough to be called serious. It must be recognized, however, that aerial attacks short of truly catastrophic have often, in the past, strengthened the victim's will to fight and to retaliate, even if asymmetrically. If American aerial pressure, plus the costs of intervention in the south, lead North Vietnam to change its policies, then views as to the merits of such operations will change accordingly.

Since much of warfare is a balancing of cost against advantage, if the costs of intervention from a sanctuary can be run up to the point where the operation ceases to be profitable, then the intervening regime will be under heavy internal pressure to change its policies. The point between profit and loss may be that at which the regime is losing so many of its cadres and soldiers as to impair its control over its own country. This could possibly eventuate from retaliatory counterguerrilla raids into the sanctuary by irregular government forces, being careful to make clear the distinction from a formal invasion by conventional forces. Whether such operations would have the desired effect must remain doubtful; even the Israelis had to escalate their response to conventional war in 1956.

Attacks against the regular military establishment of the nation giving external support to the guerrillas are not likely to be particularly effective--but can be downright dangerous. Partially this is due to the very nature of guerrilla warfare. Essentially, it is a voluntary effort, dependent on a considerable degree of motivation. Outsiders cannot by themselves organize a people's war without adequate local support.

There are some few historic examples where the threat of force, open or implied, against the unfriendly state has been a deterrent against supporting guerrillas. In 1809 French threats forced Vienna to abandon its semiovert aid to the Tyroleans, and during the Boer War British seapower, among other factors, prevented potentially hostile nations from giving aid to the Boers.

A particular problem to be considered is the scope of outside support. In the initial stages the guerrilla support requirements are limited to small arms and ammunition much of which can be obtained locally. To pass into the higher stages of warfare, however, outside support is almost always necessary

for ultimate guerrilla success. But the fortunes of war may place enough weapons into the guerrillas' hands without external aid. The Italian arms and equipment obtained in 1943 by the Balkan partisans are one such instance (Vol. III, p. 163) and in 1945 the armies of Mao Tse-tung acquired part of the equipment of the Japanese Kwantung army. These windfalls allowed the equipment of large, standard formations. The Vietminh divisions were trained in China during their war against France, and the Greek partisans obtained their heavy equipment from abroad. On the other hand, in Malaya and the Philippines the Communist guerrillas, by and large, received little direct external support and failed. The list could be prolonged almost indefinitely, merely to show that while there is no consistent pattern, guerrillas almost invariably need considerable outside support to transform themselves into an army able to fight on a conventional set-piece pattern. The rare exceptions have occurred when the armed forces of the established regime may have become so eroded from within that they have gone over en masse to the enemy. This, for instance, provided Castro with the forces for his final offensive.

Interdiction of External Support by Cutting
the Guerrilla Line of Communication
within the Afflicted Country

Normally the first, and in many ways most attractive, measure to cut external support for the guerrilla is to cut the line of communications with the source by military action within the afflicted country. This avoids diplomatic complications and minimizes adverse public opinion abroad. It allows the use of already existing organs of supervision and control operating in conjunction with the military. Two main types of action seem indicated here. First, preventive measures before the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, and second, measures designed to interdict support arriving from abroad. Naval interception, although not strictly "within the afflicted country," is in this category.

The first type of action is mainly indirect. It may consist of publicizing the efforts to alleviate the social, economic, and political problems which furnish the necessary cause for the guerrilla movement. It is possible that the establishment of Irish Home Rule in 1914 might have prevented the outbreak of the Irish troubles (although it might have caused rebellion in Ulster). At the same time internal security forces

and administration may be strengthened. To be sure, neither action can be guaranteed to prevent the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, especially if it is sponsored from abroad. Sometimes the established government may be unable to make the concessions required without totally changing its own character. However, improving the administrative machinery and changing the orientation of the armed forces from conventional toward counterguerrilla operations appears to be worthwhile.

Once battle has been joined, success in interdicting the guerrillas from external support depends to a large degree upon geographic conditions. A country isolated by natural barriers, or located among countries which oppose the guerrillas, makes easier the counterinsurgent's interdiction of external support. A small country, or one easily compartmentalized, also favors interdiction. Lengthy borders, especially if the adjoining countries are favorable to the guerrillas, as was the case in Greece, China, Algeria, Vietnam, complicate the problem of interdiction.

A high proportion of coastline to land borders usually helps the counterinsurgent because maritime traffic can be controlled, to a large degree, with a limited amount of technical means and, except in times of war, the counterinsurgent is likely to have naval supremacy. But during peacetime, and when neutrals are involved in support of the guerrilla, naval interception presents certain difficulties. Coastal traffic is notoriously hard to intercept and control and small amounts of supplies usually have reached the guerrilla along this route. Port control, even of the most stringent kind, has not always prevented the smuggling of small arms, money, and propaganda materiel. Coastal shipping and port smuggling provided sufficient materiel for the EOKA operations in Cyprus. Moreover, the most stringent port controls often cause so much economic damage, by delaying the unloading of cargo, etc., that they may become counterproductive.

Interception on the high seas is more effective but, certainly in peacetime, is likely to cause diplomatic, legal, and propaganda difficulties. The British attempts to blockade the colonies and to control neutral shipping led to the formation of a League of Armed Neutrality against England (Vol. III, p. 1). During the Boer War the search of a German mail steamer provoked a serious incident. In 1945-1948, naval interception of shipping carrying men and materiel to Palestine was only partially effective because political considerations prevented the Admiralty from halting ships on the high seas (Vol. III, p. 181).

During the Algerian war, however, the French intercepted high seas shipping with only minor international repercussions. The Royal Navy intercepted a vital shipment of arms shortly before the Irish Easter Rising of 1916 (Vol. III, p. 145). A successful example of military action against enemy bases, undertaken in large part to halt coastal traffic to the Greek partisans, was the German occupation of Leros in November 1943. Even so, this was of only limited usefulness because alternate bases in Cyprus and the Middle East were available to the Allies.

Airborne support for guerrillas was provided on a massive scale during World War II by the Western Allies as well as the Soviet Union. It was, of course, much cheaper to bring in supplies when the guerrillas were in actual possession of air strips. Then, too, personnel could be evacuated this way. The other method, essentially a one-way operation (since helicopters were not in use), was by parachute, sometimes on a massive scale. According to one source 198,000 Sten guns, 2,000 Brens, 128,000 rifles, 58,000 pistols, 723,000 grenades, 9,000 mines, and 585,000 kilograms of explosives were parachuted into France. Countermeasures against airborne support included attempts to destroy or occupy the bases, fighter and antiaircraft interception, and above all denial of suitable landing and drop zones to the guerrilla. Once the guerrilla established a secure area under his control, however, the interception of airborne supplies became more difficult. In any case it seems likely in the future, as in the past, that small amounts of supplies and small groups of key personnel can be brought in by air despite very strong countermeasures.

History provides numerous examples of operations to interdict support reaching guerrillas across land frontiers. In addition to the usual border control by customs, the counterinsurgent has invariably employed roving patrols and ambushes of guerrilla convoys. Usually supply convoys, often mule trains, move by night and guerrilla staging areas are especially vulnerable to attack. Much depends here on an active and accurate intelligence network. Excellent examples of night operations against guerrilla convoys are the actions of Major Orde Wingate and his Special Night Squads during the Arab revolt in Palestine, 1937-1938.

Patrols and static control points have sometimes been supplemented with artificial barriers such as the limes of the Romans. In more recent times both the British and the French have built land barriers to halt the influx of outside aid. During the Arab revolt in Palestine the British erected "Teggard's

wall," a barbed-wire barrier, reinforced by blockhouses, across northern Palestine and successfully interrupted infiltration from Syria. Similarly, the Boer country was compartmentalized by a chain of blockhouses, sometimes with wired intervals. In Algeria, the French built the Morice line to seal off the Algerian-Tunisian border. Electrified wire, mine fields, aerial observation, and the evacuation of the population from the border area combined to make a tight seal. The experiment, while costly, was highly successful in interdicting the movement of personnel and supplies. However, the forced removal of the population in Algeria was counterproductive and thus aided the guerrilla.

Interdiction of supplies may have unforeseen effects on guerrilla warfare. In the case of the Greek Communists, massive foreign support tempted them prematurely into large-scale operations. On the other hand, isolation of the FLN in Algeria prevented it from passing into the large units phase of operations.

Drawing the Guerrilla Away from his Outside Support

Relations between the sponsor nation and the supported guerrilla are likely to be difficult. Guerrilla warfare requires months and even years of suffering and during this period tensions may well develop between the sponsoring nation and the guerrillas, indeed even among foreign-based leadership (governments in exile), and the men in the field. At the simplest level the guerrilla feels that he is exploited and starved of support; the supporting nation or government may feel that the guerrillas have suspiciously autonomous tendencies.

Even when guerrilla warfare is sponsored by governments in exile, the guerrillas often tend to grow away from the aims and character of that government. The guerrilla develops a dynamism of his own which the government in exile may not understand and may not be willing to support. French Royalist and British support of the Vendée rising was not very successful, in large part because the French *émigré* leadership was unwilling to adapt itself to the "social and military conditions of partisan warfare" (Vol. II, p. 1). The split between the governments in exile and the Balkan guerrillas is a prime example and the Germans were able to exploit it and even to draw manpower from royalist guerrillas against Communist-led partisans (Vol. III, p. 163). Or, as in Greece, ideological differences between the guerrillas and

their sponsors, coupled with military defeat, may well lead to a decision by the sponsoring nation to end its support rather than to waste further assets.

Military action, keeping constant pressure on the guerrillas, is likely to hasten the process. It may result merely in splitting the guerrilla movement, but it also may result in a real division between the guerrilla and his sponsor. On the tactical level, it also is true that military pressure and successes of the counterinsurgent are likely to be reflected in the relations between the guerrillas, the population, and the outside supporters. Thus it was common experience during World War II that local support for Allied missions cooled and sometimes was withdrawn completely whenever the fortunes of war, local as well as on the main front, favored the Axis.

Coupled with the above operations is the necessity to provide easy surrender terms for the guerrilla. This again will give him a choice of accepting or rejecting outside support and may again tend to drive a wedge between the two parties.

Part Three: Evaluation

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS

General

1. An insurgency that enjoys an appreciable measure of voluntary popular support reflects a very real maladjustment in the society in which the insurgency occurs. Thus the employment of military force necessary to suppress insurrection must be integrated with nonmilitary measures designed to correct the maladjustment, which will involve all departments of government, and affect all elements of the society.
2. To be militarily effective, an insurgent guerrilla force must have voluntary or forced support from a substantial element of the local population in its area of activity. At a minimum, this support includes food and information. Physical and moral forms of external support can contribute substantially to effective insurgency. Guerrilla operations can sometimes be temporarily continued by an insurgent force without local support when it can receive regular and adequate physical support from outside sources, but in such a case the force begins to lose the essential characteristics of the guerrilla.
3. Ultimately, effective counterinsurgent action to isolate the guerrilla from his sources of support will permit the established government to seize the initiative from the guerrilla and through military attrition assure his complete defeat due to his lack of recruits, supplies, and intelligence.
4. There are three fundamental preconditions for effectively isolating the guerrilla from local and/or external support: a high order of military competence in the counterguerrilla forces; an effective local administration working in close coordination with the military forces; and a perceptive and substantial response to popular grievances which have contributed to the insurgency. In further detail these preconditions can be spelled out as follows:

a. Military competence in counterinsurgency implies not only forces with a high order of military effectiveness in conventional tactics and techniques, but also an ability through training, experience, and acclimatization to adapt these tactics and techniques to the local environment in which the guerrilla is operating. It includes leadership which is not only fully proficient in conventional operations, but which is prepared (inherently or by indoctrination) to apply this proficiency both imaginatively and flexibly.

b. Isolating the guerrilla from local support (and often from external support, as well) requires a local administration which can initiate and implement a long series of administrative measures to control the movement of population and goods, to gather information, and to police affected areas. These measures, in turn, require competent, honest, and humane administrators and policemen. Use of military personnel in these essentially administrative roles may sometimes be necessary, but this can only be a short-term expedient, not a substitute.

c. Every insurgency situation is the result either of popular grievances which have led to revolt or external manipulation which has exploited or created some elements of popular grievance. Military and administrative effectiveness offer an opportunity to provide a response to the grievance or grievances in such a way as to offer a viable and more attractive alternative to what the guerrilla promises, and by contrast to remove some of his support. Perhaps the principal reason for French failure in counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam and Algeria was their apparent inability to present a truly viable alternative; in contrast, the British in Malaya were able to offer both independence and a better life.

Isolation from Local Support

5. The military are fundamentally handicapped in dealing with the guerrilla because he is a part of the indigenous society and thus not readily identifiable as an enemy. Therefore, the mere application of military force, even on a massive scale, is not effective until or unless soldiers can clearly identify and attack the guerrilla. Indiscriminate military efforts may aggravate the very maladjustments that have produced the guerrilla.

6. The problem of identifying the guerrilla so as to distinguish him readily from the indigenous society, and thus be

able to fight him and effectively to isolate him from his sources of support, has not yet been solved in a satisfactory, comprehensive manner.

7. Despite lack of precise means of early identification of the guerrilla, general action designed to isolate him from the society can be effective and can contribute toward more precise identification since the guerrilla is forced to fight to reopen or to retain his links to the sources of his support.

8. Isolation of the guerrilla from local support should include measures aimed at: (a) withdrawing the local civilian populace from supporting or adhering to the insurgent cause, (b) inducing popular loyalty or support for the incumbent government, (c) physically denying guerrillas access to local support, and (d) defeating the insurgent forces militarily. There will be considerable overlap in measures fitting these four distinct categories, which are spelled out in further detail below:

a. Experience shows that military action can contribute directly to administrative measures intended to withdraw the local civilian population support from the guerrilla. This includes: provision of physical security to permit effective law and order as well as protection and security to the civilian populace, particularly security from terrorism and from raids; civic action in support of the political and administrative goals of removing the grievances which led directly or indirectly to the insurgency; psychological warfare (which must be combined with both active military operations and effective nonmilitary measures both to attract popular support and to draw the people away from the guerrilla).

b. Actions which military forces can take to attract popular support to the government, while drawing the population away from the guerrilla, include the following: seizure of all opportunities to encourage rapport between the military forces and the population by kindness, consideration, courtesy, and various types of "civic actions" to help them and to improve their living conditions which troops can take without interfering with their primary combat missions; all possible measures to avoid casualties to noncombatants or damage to their possessions when they are inadvertently in the way of combat operations.

c. Action to deny guerrillas physical access to local support includes both supply denial or control, and population control. Both of these measures require a closely integrated combination of military and administrative actions.

d. Defeating the guerrilla militarily will require efforts to bring him to battle as frequently as possible against forces with superior combat capability. Threatening or destroying the guerrilla's links to his support will probably force him to reopen or retain these links, and should contribute to efforts to seize the initiative and to wear him down by military attrition.

9. Militarily protected physical obstacles to impede unauthorized communication, to prevent unhindered movement of goods of all types, and to inhibit uncontrolled movement of local population and of guerrillas, have been effective in facilitating both supply denial and population control. They have also severely hampered the flow of information to guerrillas.

10. Action against the guerrilla insurgent must be prompt, thorough, initially massive, and intensive in order to offset the guerrilla's inherent initiative advantage. Counterinsurgent responses that merely match, or offset, what the guerrilla is capable of doing will usually be too little and too late. A natural desire to avoid excessive force and unpopular measures, e.g., curfews, food control, in suppressing insurgency among one's own people tends toward a government hesitancy and a restraint that permits the guerrilla to retain the initiative, and thereby to increase his strength and prestige. In such a situation, government reactions to the guerrilla tend to increase gradually in scope and intensity, so lagging behind events that the result is a gradual frustration-induced escalation to the point where either the insurgent is eventually successful or the counterinsurgents are required to employ, with considerable ruthlessness, a greater effort and far more sweeping measures than what might have seemed excessive initially, but which could have suppressed the insurrection in the first place. The cost of the more protracted effort in blood, treasure, and unfavorable political and economic consequences is inevitably far greater than a deliberately massive effort at an early stage of the insurgency.

11. Force ratios cannot be applied with arithmetic rigidity. As troops and police improve in quality, fewer will be needed for combat operations, but more may be needed to secure pacified areas. As the guerrillas suffer casualties, the ratios against them will shift in turn, but to retain the initiative against the numerically reduced insurgents may require extensive operations. The highly trained, expert soldier; the policeman with his intelligence sources; the part-time home guardsman; each has different (though related) and important functions in counterinsurgency.

12. Unity of command and coordination of military and civilian effort (administrative, political, and psychological) by the counterinsurgent are important if the guerrilla is to be isolated. All parts of the counterinsurgent team must pull together and in the same direction.

13. Local commanders should be given considerable latitude in offering conciliation and clemency to insurgents, particularly after successful military punitive action. Rewards for defection have been particularly effective in such circumstances. They are particularly effective in counteracting forced support.

14. Ethnic differences within the local population could possibly interfere with the counterinsurgent effort, but can be exploited to deny guerrillas supply, intelligence, recruits, and sanctuary.

15. Continuity of effective intelligence, essential in isolating the guerrilla, is best achieved through a single civil police intelligence system. The military, which of course requires adequate combat intelligence, should not attempt to compete with or to duplicate this civil system unnecessarily, but rather should avail themselves of its services through close and intensive liaison.

Isolation from External Support

16. For ultimate success in achieving its political objectives, an insurgent guerrilla force must not only seek and retain the support of a substantial element of the local population in its area of activity, but must also obtain sufficient outside moral support to obtain general or de facto recognition as a legitimate belligerent and eventually as a legal government.

17. Experience shows that guerrillas do not necessarily need decisive military successes in order to obtain sufficient outside support that will eventually enable them to be successful politically; the government, however, needs essentially total victory so that it can establish and maintain the security acceptable to the population.

18. One of the critical elements in the success of guerrilla movements has often (although not invariably) been the accessibility of territory of a friendly power which can be used: (a) as a base of supplies and reinforcements; (b) for refuge, training, and restaging of guerrilla forces; and (c) for moral

and public relations support, and communications with the outside world. Once the guerrilla has access to such a sanctuary, he will generally fight if necessary to maintain his links with the outside.

19. Military measures which have been successful in isolating guerrillas from outside support include: such sustained pressure on the guerrilla that external support must be on a scale more expensive than the supporting nation or nations are willing to continue; clemency and conciliation for the guerrilla to exploit any differences which may exist between him and the supporting power or powers; physical obstacles--including naval blockade and sealing land frontiers--to interdict or inhibit movement of supplies and reinforcements from the supporting power; punitive raids into neutral sanctuaries from which outside support has been provided, or where the guerrillas have taken refuge.

20. Communist sponsorship of insurgencies has been particularly effective in exploiting the concept of physical sanctuary for guerrilla forces in nominally neutral or nonbelligerent territory. The fact and dangers of a situation of world power bipolarity and of mutual nuclear capability has created fears of the possibility of escalation and has served to inhibit legitimate governments, and their Free World supporters, from direct response against either the actual sanctuary territory or the major Communist power or powers directly or indirectly sponsoring the insurgency. (Sanctuary, of course, works both ways in such a situation.) The fact that the United States has made air attacks against sanctuary regions has not to date affected this reluctance to intervene against sanctuaries with conventional ground forces.

21. Nonmilitary measures which have been successful in isolating guerrillas from outside support include: diplomatic pressures on other nations to prevent surrender of the attributes of legitimacy to the insurgents; measures to obtain the active support of other nations in asserting the legitimacy of the established government; an active, aggressive propaganda-psychological warfare campaign to offset that of the insurgents, and, if possible, seize the propaganda initiative; strong economic pressures --from blacklisting to sanctions--against nations providing any kind of physical or moral support to the insurgents.

22. Insurgency as sponsored by the Communists is a multi-faceted form of war in a highly variable set of circumstances, being intensively exploited by an enemy whose central doctrine has proved tactically flexible. It can be countered only with tactics of equal flexibility.

23. The Communist use and sponsorship of insurgency through support of "wars of national liberation," has drastically modified the nature of the problems and challenges of insurgent warfare. The United States must recognize, and adapt itself to, the fact that in such instances insurgency is merely a blatant method of expansionist aggression. This does not in any way invalidate experience in the tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency, but it does require the development of new operational and organizational concepts for the application of these tactics and techniques.

CHAPTER VII. A THEORY OF ISOLATION*

Introduction

The conclusions which have emerged from the study of "Isolating the Guerrilla" suggest a basis for a theory of isolation in counterinsurgency. This chapter is intended to suggest such a theory.

The analytic problem involved in developing a conceptual framework based on a series of case studies is threefold: first, to define the area of inquiry and establish criteria of relevance as to what should be investigated; second, to compare the pattern of the given structure or action in respect to similarities and differences; and third, to make an attempt to account for differences (variations) in terms of certain elements (variables) of the situation in which action takes place.

This chapter attempts to formulate generalizations concerning the fundamental principles and variations in the strategy and tactics of isolating guerrillas and to relate the choice of means to a set of situational variables. The ultimate purpose of such generalizations is to develop a theory of "isolation." But before this can be done it is necessary to place "isolation" in a proper perspective by establishing the relationship of isolation to other types of counterinsurrectionary activity and to political warfare. From this it will be possible to draw a dividing line between what is relevant and what is irrelevant to investigating strategies of isolation.

*This chapter has been adapted, with substantial modifications, from an analytical paper prepared for this study by Dr. Janos.

A Model of Counterinsurrection:
A Form of Political Warfare

As a first step in establishing an analytic framework for the concept of "isolating the guerrilla" a model insurrectionary situation may be constructed. In so doing it is important to make a distinction between irregular forces alien to the civilian population (for instance a group of foreign agents or soldiers parachuted into hostile territory with the task of harassment, sabotage, and disruption of communications) and the guerrilla who can count on the active or passive support of the local population either voluntarily or through force. In the former case we have a group employing guerrilla tactics, but which is not in any true sense comprised of guerrillas. Such a force poses a purely military problem, to be dealt with in purely military terms.

In the model representing a true guerrilla situation, however, the insurgent is practically coterminous with the population; civilians perform insurgent acts as part-time or full-time guerrillas. The fighting man is a recruit from local society. He is dependent on fellow members of the society for intelligence and supplies. The most important sanctuary of the fighting man is his human environment. After performing his guerrilla act, he changes roles and submerges in the local population. In such a situation the tasks of the counterinsurgent forces is political as well as military. Counterinsurgency involves political warfare with the objective of establishing a monopoly of control over a given area and population. In contrast to military strategy, the target of political warfare is the entire population and not an enemy army.

The most extreme form of political warfare and population control is total liquidation, genocide, or physical dislocation. This strategy was applied against recalcitrant North American Indians. It was initiated (but not completed) in the Vendée. The Soviets applied this strategy in pacifying rural Lithuania after World War II; part of the inhabitants of the country were exterminated, the rest transported to remote regions in Siberia. The Communists also exterminated a substantial proportion of the Jewish population in Russia as an alleged part of the counter-guerrilla effort during the Russian civil war. Both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany attempted to exterminate the potentially hostile intelligentsia in Poland during World War II.

The second strategic alternative is the use of terror, in which extreme measures are used to suppress insurgency. In this

concept of pacification the population is not doomed to extermination, but it becomes the principal target of operations and is subjected to ruthless and random acts of coercion. It is a violent means of preventing the population from participating in insurgency, and therefore is an extreme form of isolating insurgent forces. The methods of terror and the conditions that lead to its use are described in the case studies of the Russian suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and of German acts of violence against the Balkan and the Russian populations.

The third strategic alternative is that which, for purposes of this analysis, we shall describe as "isolation." It is the isolation of the guerrilla from the population by less extreme physical or psychological techniques. The former will include tactical barriers and surveillance, the latter psychological warfare. Violence may and will be applied but in a selective and punitive rather than random and pre-emptive manner. The essence of the strategy is persuasion, the use of propaganda to spread the belief that there is much to be lost and little to be gained by giving the guerrilla aid and comfort. Propaganda by word, of course, will have to be supplemented by propaganda by deed. In order to be successful, the government has to demonstrate that it is able to remove the conditions of popular dissatisfaction; that it is able to protect the population from the vengeance of the guerrilla; and, above all, that it is winning rather than losing the war. The success of isolation will therefore be dependent on military operations. If the government is able to maintain its military ascendency, its control over the population is half established.

Conditions for Selecting Isolation Tactics

Before discussing variations of the strategy of isolation, the conditions under which the strategy will be selected as the instrument of pacification must be established. What elements of a situation will guide the choice of isolation as a means to attain the ultimate political objective of population control?

1. Popular support. It must be obvious that the strategy of pacification will be related to the degree of popular support given to the insurgents and counterinsurgents (government). If the bulk of the population actively, or at least passively, supports the government's efforts to combat the insurgency, the operations will have a predominantly military character. If the population is divided, "isolation" will be a feasible strategy

of political warfare. However, if and when popular support is increasing for the guerrillas, the feasibility of terror will increase as opposed to the less extreme form of isolation. Theoretically, of course, in extreme cases the strategy of total liquidation would be considered by totalitarian governments.

2. Capabilities. The strategy of terror and total liquidation requires overwhelming military preponderance, again as was evidenced in the suppression of the Hungarian revolt of 1956. In the absence of such preponderance a campaign of terror will remain ineffective, as suggested by the example of the French expeditionary force in Mexico, 1861-1867. Thus, the second controlling variable of counterinsurgent strategy will be relative military capabilities.

3. Transpacification goals. The selection of means to obtain the objective of population control will also depend on the long-range perspective and goals of the counterinsurgent. Is he interested in stable and efficient government after the defeat of the insurrection, or is he, as a foreign occupying force, merely interested in temporary control in order to promote the goal of winning a war in another geographical area? If the ultimate goal is stable and efficient government, the use of large-scale terror will rarely be the principal means of pacification. On the other hand, temporary control with limited future objectives will be conducive to terroristic techniques of pacification. This might seem to be contradicted by the Hungarian experience of 1956 because here the Soviets were presumably interested in long-run stability and consolidation. These considerations, however, were superseded by another set of goals concerning the overall stability of the Soviet bloc and the domestic political system in the Soviet Union.

4. The "will" of the incumbent. In his study On War, von Clausewitz argues that the "will" or morale of the fighting man is as significant as physical-military capabilities. This proposition is particularly relevant in certain forms of political warfare, since "tougher" techniques of terror and genocide have a tendency to tax the morale of the army of pacification. Such techniques can be applied systematically only if the counterinsurgent and his auxiliaries have a strong rationale for the justness and the morality of their action. An army of pacification animated by nationalist, revolutionary, or religious symbols (like the Republican forces in the Vendée, the Soviet forces in Hungary, the Nazi SS in exterminating Jews, or the Spanish Inquisition) may survive the horrors of pacification better than the de-ideologized army of the modern Western democracy.

The Elements of Isolation Strategy

What then are the variations of the strategy of isolation as it has been discussed in preceding paragraphs? What elements of the situation control the selection of the tactics to be used to achieve the strategic objective?

Guerrilla Resources

It is obvious that some of the most sophisticated modern techniques suggested (fingerprinting, mug shots, computers) or actually applied (barbed-wire fences around villages, the use of flood lights on public roads, electric fences) are costly. An embattled government facing massive popular rebellion can hardly count on an excess of resources that are necessary to the employment of these technological devices. This may also apply to resettlement programs. It should be remembered that such extensive and expensive programs have been undertaken only by colonial or "supporting" powers such as Britain in Malaya and France in Algeria and the United States in Vietnam.

Social Background of the Guerrilla

A further hypothesis that we may suggest is that the tactics of the counterinsurgent will vary according to the social background of the insurgent. If the hard core of fighters is recruited from industrial workers, the means of isolation will be different from those used in a conflict in which the "activists" are peasants or tribesmen. The peasant as a guerrilla lives off the land, he is more mobile than the worker because he can stay away for prolonged periods, and even in the high season of agricultural labor he can be substituted by members of his family. On the other hand, the worker and his family have to rely on wages and the factory bench. His job requires skills, he cannot be easily substituted by members of his family. Thus, where the hard core of the rebels are industrial workers, the struggle will be confined to cities and will have a part-time character with limited engagements.

The appropriate response patterns for different backgrounds have not emerged in discrete form from the case studies. But one proposition seems to have general validity: the destruction of the production base (factory, farm, etc.) tends to be counterproductive, because then the part-time insurgent is more

disposed to transform himself into a full-time partisan. This appears to have been fully realized by Soviet commanders in Hungary in 1956, when they insisted that all factories should start to operate and all economic activity be resumed immediately after the suppression of the uprising.

The Setting of the Insurgency

It is one of the cardinal principles of political as well as military warfare that strategy should be adapted to and make use of the conditions of the environment. This includes not only the terrain, but also (in the case of political warfare) the existing social conditions. The selection of strategically relevant aspects of the setting is thus a critically important task in developing a theory of counterinsurrection.

Ecology. The first setting variable that ought to be considered in determining the tactics of isolation is the ecology of society. Here one might construct a number of complex typologies. However, for the purposes of the present analysis we will confine our propositions to distinctions between urban and rural societies.

In one important respect the problem of isolation is more difficult in cities than in the countryside, due to the dimensions and the impersonal character of social relations. In the village the stranger is immediately recognized and the pattern of rural settlement is such that--within or around villages--it is relatively easy to set up physical barriers to restrict the movement of men and materiel. By contrast, in the city the movement of strangers and the flow of reinforcements are much harder to control. This usually has to be done on the basis of small units. Counterinsurgents in big European cities have generally used the concierges of apartment houses as a source of information. In times of crisis and street fighting (Hungary, 1956; Paris, 1830 and 1848) there have been orders from the counterinsurgents to keep all gates locked at all hours of the day, which is the equivalent of setting up watch towers and barbed wire around the village in the countryside.

However, on a general basis, an urban population can be more easily controlled in times of insurrection by an efficient government through a well-developed network of informers, raids on houses, and spot checks at busy intersections during which people of suspicious identity may be detained. On balance,

however, as clearly demonstrated by our case studies, the guerrilla has greater scope for initiative and for military operations in a rural environment.

Technical-economic diversity. The techniques of isolation will not only vary with the ecology, but also with the technical-economic diversity of society. The more diversified the division of labor in a given society and the more advanced the economic system, the easier it will be to disrupt "normal" life, and the more difficult it will be to maintain and defend it on the part of the government. The sabotaging of the power plant of a big city, for instance, may work havoc and panic on its inhabitants. Economic life depends on communications and the free flow of transportation. To keep, or win over, a population, the counterinsurgents will have to do their utmost to guard the services and the functioning of the economy.

Ethnic-linguistic fragmentation. The last setting variable that the counterinsurgent should consider is the homogeneity or fragmentation, particularly the ethnic-linguistic fragmentation of a given society. The last seems to be particularly relevant in the period of modern nationalism. The established government will usually exploit ethnic divisions to deny the guerrilla supply, intelligence, recruits, and sanctuary.

The Impact of Ideology

Finally, although tangential to the narrower question of isolation, some consideration must be given to the role of ideology in the outcome of insurrections. Ideology, for purposes of this analysis, can be defined in terms of a set of basic beliefs about social reality combined with value preferences of an absolute character. Accordingly, ideology is both a guide for action and a psychological instrument to rationalize the consequences of action. Communist ideology, for instance, includes the ultimate goal of a perfect and ethical society and defends political means and the necessity of sacrifice both in terms of this goal and in terms of the inevitable character of social processes.

One generally accepted proposition concerning ideology is that such commonly shared beliefs and ultimate goals are powerful factors in building up group cohesion and morale. Thus, if a ruling elite and its auxiliaries are animated by commonly

accepted goals and ethical principles, it will be more difficult to overthrow their regime. They will also be willing to use more ruthless methods with less remorse given the absolute nature of their commitment. Similarly, a strongly indoctrinated and ideology-oriented guerrilla will be better able to survive in the face of great adversity and military superiority of his opponent.

What is not clear, however, is how the content of ideology affects the behavior of an insurgent. Do different ideologies have a differential impact on behavior? Do Communists, Fascists, religious fanatics, and others behave differently in a guerrilla situation, and if so in what particular respect? Or to put it in different terms, what aspects of ideology are decisive in conditioning insurgent (and counterinsurgent) behavior?

In this theoretical context, a breakdown along Communist-non-Communist lines may be less useful than a distinction between revolutionary and nonrevolutionary (conservative) insurgents or guerrillas.* The difference between the two will be basically in terms of the price they are willing to pay. The revolutionary with his teleological and future-oriented perspective will be ready to inflict greater deprivations and demand much greater sacrifices than his conservative counterpart. The latter, as a matter of habit, will protect existing social institutions and their integrity, and may fear destruction more than defeat. This attitude was characteristic of some of the anti-Napoleonic guerrillas. The King of Prussia, for instance, in reply to a memorandum by Generals Scharnhorst and Gneisenau expressed his doubt whether the anarchy of a popular insurrection would not be a greater evil than surrender to the French.

The second significant aspect of ideology is the group in reference to which the goals and principles are applicable. In the ideology of 19th-Century liberalism, as well as 20th-Century fascism, the group whose salvation was sought was the nation. In contrast, for Marxism-Leninism, at least as the ideology has been known until recently, the reference group transcends ethnic, linguistic, and political boundaries. It is the workers of the world. Somewhat similarly, the reference group of religious movements is often international and concerned with the welfare of

*The special nature of the use of Communist ideology as a basis for a new kind of imperialism is, of course, a different issue and is discussed at considerable length elsewhere in this report.

the immediate community is tempered by ultimate concern with salvation.

From the point of view of counterinsurrection and political warfare, the internationalist (or supranationalist) insurgent with his universalistic orientation will be a more formidable opponent than the nationalist with his particularistic orientation. Whether as insurgent or counterinsurgent, the nationalist will usually consider the organic unity of the community as one of his goals and will probably be reluctant to risk the extinction (or decimation) of the nation as a prize for victory in guerrilla warfare.

Summation

Five major propositions emerge from this theoretical analysis:

1. Counterinsurrection, political warfare, and isolation represent different levels of analysis and generality.
2. Political warfare is a type of counterinsurrectionary activity analytically distinct from "military" warfare.
3. "Isolation" is one strategy of internal political warfare. As such it is a means of establishing ultimate control over a territory, and in particular over its population.
4. The tactics of isolation (the variations within the strategy) are both military and administrative, depending on resources, the character of the guerrilla, and the setting in which the conflict takes place.
5. More intensive study is required as to the role of ideology in insurrection and in particular on the extent to which Communist ideology in insurrection will affect the tactics of counterinsurrection.

From the point of view of practical politics different "levels of analysis" (first proposition above) refer to different levels of decision-making and responsibilities. Decisions concerning objectives, costs, and the time factor (rapid or protracted pacification) are usually made at the highest level of national politics.

The adaptation of means to the policy objective usually takes place at the staff level and involves political and administrative as well as military decisions. In the most critical stages of an insurrection it can be expected that military requirements and decisions will take operational precedence over those that are nonmilitary--although the ultimate political objectives will be overriding, and the use or resort to certain means and techniques may be ruled out by political decision-makers. The use of terror, for instance, may be vetoed on political grounds even though it may be the optimum strategy from the point of view of military operations.

It is obvious that the tentative theory of isolation which has emerged from this analysis requires an organizational mechanism that is neither wholly military nor wholly political, yet which assures the closest integration of both in response to overall political authority. The elaboration of such a mechanism is beyond the scope of this study. It would appear, however, to be an urgent requirement for effective employment of isolation as a strategy of counterinsurrection.

CHAPTER VIII. APPLICABILITY OF CONCLUSIONS
TO CURRENT PROBLEMS*

General

The terms of reference for this study requires HERO to "suggest means to separate . . . guerrillas from the rest of the population" and to "suggest workable responses to outside support." Accordingly, it is the purpose of this chapter to point out some specific ways in which the conclusions can be applied to current operational and policy problems facing the United States in the area of counterinsurgency.

First, serious consideration has been given to ways in which operations currently under way in Vietnam might benefit from adaptations of several of the conclusions in the previous chapter of this report. Following this are some suggestions regarding possible improvements in general readiness to deal with insurgency situations. Some general comments are then offered regarding the relationship of the results of this study to current issues of counterinsurgency theory, doctrine, and organization.

Possible Applications in Vietnam

The Obstacle Concept

The study has shown conclusively that physical obstacles, when properly defended, have been most effective in isolating

*Scholars participating in this study were not unanimous in endorsing the recommendations and suggestions of this chapter. The editor, with the approval of HERO's Policy Advisory Committee, takes full responsibility for this chapter and its contents.

guerrilla forces from both local and external support. HERO believes that urgent consideration should be given to the possibility of applying this concept to Vietnam. Specifically, serious consideration should be given to the establishment of a cleared and defended barrier strip or corridor along the entire land frontier of Vietnam or--as a possibly more attractive alternative--along the northern and northwestern land frontier, in combination with the counterinsurgency action suggested below. If feasible, such a defended barrier might effectively isolate the Viet Cong guerrillas from the external support which appears to be indispensable to their continued effectiveness.

This is not an original suggestion; similar ideas have been considered and rejected in the past for various reasons, mainly because of difficulty and cost. The general magnitude, expense, and engineering difficulties (as well as military difficulties) involved in establishing such a barrier would be enormous. There is, furthermore, a psychological aspect to such a program that might be assumed to reflect a defensive, defeatist attitude.

The participants in this study are neither organized, nor technically qualified, to undertake the detailed and thorough investigation of this proposition. The reasons for a detailed examination of this project have seemed sufficiently weighty to a group with considerable and varied professional competence, however, as to suggest that the project warrants serious attention. The reasons follow:

The principal technical problems in the actual establishment of such a barrier appear to be those of engineering, logistical drain, time, security for the working parties, and overall expense. Those of us who are familiar with this and comparable terrain in Southeast Asia have no doubts that the establishment of the corridor is technically feasible. The example of the Ledo Road, some 271 miles of which was cut through virgin jungle, with a trace at least 150 feet wide, and across varied terrain quite similar to that of Vietnam's frontiers, is clear evidence that the job could be done. The land frontiers of South Vietnam are about 850 miles long, of which about 450 miles lie along the Cambodian frontier.

As to time and level of effort, it has been arbitrarily calculated from scanty records available, that the construction of the Ledo Road, from the time really serious work and effort began, took a total effort of a force very roughly the equivalent of 20 engineer construction companies, over a period of 12 months, at a cost estimated at \$149 million. Only a fraction of this time and effort, however, was applied to the clearing of

the trace. On the basis of observation, it is assumed that in the order of 5% of the effort was applied to the clearing of the 150-foot trace. (This assumption could be wrong by a factor of two or more without affecting the argument here presented.) Thus, approximately the same engineering effort that went into the construction of the Ledo Road could clear an 800-yard strip along the frontiers with North Vietnam and Laos, or something in the order of twice that effort could clear an 800-yard strip along the entire land frontier of South Vietnam. Further assuming that a concentration of effort twice as large as that which went into the Ledo Road could be efficiently employed, a corridor along the northern part of the frontier could possibly be cleared in approximately 6 months; the entire frontier corridor could possibly be completed in 12 months by a force not exceeding 10 engineer battalions or the equivalent.

Obviously, such rough and arbitrary calculations would have to be checked by serious engineering studies.

As to the logistical effort, if this project has the potential value suggested, then diversion of the necessary resources should be quite feasible. The same is true of cost, which (on the basis of the Ledo example and allowing for inflation since 1944) would presumably not exceed \$200 million for the northern frontier effort, or \$400 million for the entire corridor. These costs and effort are very great. In comparison with what the United States is now spending, and may expect to spend in future years, these figures become much more reasonable. They would still be reasonable, in this context, if the rough estimates given above should prove too small by a factor of two or more.

It is impossible, in this context, to estimate the total combat force which would be required to protect the engineering force engaged on this task. Obviously it would have to be substantial; it would appear to be well within the capability of current US land, air, and naval air force commitments to Vietnam.

Without detailed study it is not possible to suggest the specific nature of the obstacles that would be used to block the cleared area, nor the specific forces, tactics, and techniques to patrol the barrier, or to react to either large-scale intrusions or small-scale infiltration. Presumably barbed-wire concertinas, land mines, incapacitating chemicals, and the like, would contribute to the obstacle. Air and ground patrols, combined with rapid helicopter movement of the requisite ground combat forces from a relatively small number of troop concentrations, would be a part of the defense scheme.

There will be some other problems (nonmilitary as well as military) which will require consideration in any overall study of such a project.

One of these is security of planning, which should also consider possible cover plans to explain the increased engineering equipment shipments (although perhaps the additional equipment beyond what is already going into engineering construction efforts in Vietnam would not be so great as to arouse suspicions).

Another problem will be the economic impact of such a project, particularly on the already strained economy of South Vietnam. The impact of this cannot be assessed in this report. Nor is it possible to evaluate what use, if any, might feasibly be made of the significant amount of lumber which will be produced by the effort. The long-term economic impact of the project might well be beneficial in terms of contribution to the stability of Southeast Asia.

As to the overall military problem, HERO does not agree with the argument that the establishment and defense of such a barrier would be a defensive, Maginot-like approach. The amount of effort which would be required for a defensive effort against small-scale infiltration would probably permit a reduction, and certainly no increase, in the forces now employed in purely defensive and security roles in South Vietnam. Obviously, such a cordon could not and should not be expected to block a major military invasion or penetration. But it will permit quick identification and location of any such effort and greatly facilitate any efforts which need to be made to react to, and to defeat, such a penetration.

There is nothing defeatist or inherently defensive about field fortifications in themselves. It is the use which is made of such works which determines the attitude and spirit of the fighting forces. Warfare against guerrilla insurgents is--in purely military terms--essentially a strategically defensive task; the establishment of a barrier corridor would not make it any more so. It should, in fact, contribute with more lasting results to an increase in the tactical offensive effort, which should be waged as aggressively as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dealing with the
Sanctuary Problem (c)

(c) Whether or not a barrier corridor is established, serious consideration must be given to the possibility of undertaking large-scale expeditions into the territories of Laos and Cambodia to diminish the utility of these areas as sanctuaries and as communications routes for the Viet Cong.

(c) The weighing of risks, dangers, and losses against possible benefits is a politico-military problem beyond the scope of this study and requiring the most intensive additional study of its own. The problem of privileged sanctuaries for guerrillas has been treated differently in different circumstances and with varying results that probably defy any conclusion other than that the circumstances must be considered separately in each different case. There is ample US experience to provide a basis for justifying punitive expeditions against sanctuaries if such seem desirable.

(c) For a number of reasons the international repercussions of any expedition into Cambodia would probably be far greater, and more damaging politically to the United States, than would be the case for an expedition into Laos. This fact prompts the suggestion that an expedition into southeast Laos, combined with the cleared barrier corridor only along the North Vietnam and Laos frontiers of South Vietnam, might eliminate the sanctuaries and assure the isolation of the Viet Cong from overland support from North Vietnam. This would have the additional advantage of reducing the amount of time and effort that would be required for establishing the barrier corridor and might result in a smaller total force contingent to be applied to the overall isolation effort. Furthermore, an important additional and incidental benefit to be derived would be to extend the control (with US support and involvement) of the Laotian government into the area now controlled by the Pathet Lao east of the Mekong and north of the Cambodian frontier.

Possible Operations in
North Vietnam (c)

(c) It is obvious from this study that a true guerrilla force cannot operate effectively in an insurgency without local support. It is most unlikely that the Communist regime in North Vietnam would, in the foreseeable future, be sufficiently vulnerable to permit establishment of a guerrilla insurgent force in North Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) The study also suggests, however, that effective military forces using guerrilla tactics can, under some specialized circumstances, maintain themselves in hostile territory if they can be assured of adequate external support. There is reason to believe that large-scale but covert operations against selected targets in North Vietnam might be feasible for forces employing guerrilla tactics; could yield significant tactical advantage; and could be accomplished without the possible dangers of an overt invasion of the North Vietnam sanctuary.

(c) Presumably such a force would operate as a long-range penetration unit, and its activities would neither be announced nor officially acknowledged. At some later time it might prove desirable to make the operation overt, or to initiate an overt operation, but this would probably not be desirable under circumstances as they now exist and are likely to exist in the immediate future.

Reducing Combat Risk and Damage to the Civil Population (c)

(c) Important elements in any counterinsurgency program are the provision of security to the local population and undertaking measures to assure them of the consideration and support of the counterinsurgency forces. It is desirable to do anything possible, and militarily acceptable, that can reduce the impact of the war on the civil population, particularly if this can be presented positively in the counterinsurgent propaganda program.

(c) This fact provides an opportunity to the United States to initiate the use on a regular basis of temporarily incapacitating chemical or biological agents in operations in Vietnam in which elements of the civilian population might be unavoidably involved.

(c) There are many political, diplomatic, and psychological problems which could inhibit a declared US policy of employing temporarily incapacitating chemical and biological weapons in Vietnam or any other counterinsurgency situation.* There is

(c) *HERO has recently completed a classified study for the Army's Combat Developments Command which bears some relationship to this issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

reason to believe, however, that the military advantages which accrue from such use, in addition to the unquestionably valuable humanitarian and psychological advantages which could be derived if the matter is properly handled, warrant a most serious effort to obtain a high-level governmental decision to employ such weapons in Vietnam. If the United States takes a positive public information approach, general public acceptance of the employment of such weapons can probably be obtained, and (aside from any purely military advantages) great political benefits can be reaped in Vietnam by making certain that the population knows that US forces will do everything possible to keep them from being killed or permanently injured in battle and to keep from destroying their property.

Application to Counterinsurgency Readiness (u)

Creation of an Improved Counterinsurgency Intervention Capability (u)

(u) In order to provide the effective military support and presence which our studies have shown to be an essential part of isolating the guerrilla, as and when the interests of the United States and its allies may require, consideration should be given to immediate development of a capability by the US armed forces that would permit, on short notice, the commitment of an appreciable force of air and ground combat units with appropriate logistical support. These units should be prepared to operate independently, or as elements of a larger force, at some distance from their operational bases; they must be trained and prepared to operate creditably and with increasing efficiency in jungle, forest, and mountain; they must be led by officers and noncommissioned officers well schooled in the fundamentals of guerrilla tactics and counterinsurgency. Any such force, when committed, should include one or more properly trained detachments specifically organized for suitable civic action missions in the area of operations.

(u) Establishment of such a capability would require development of doctrine, and the maintenance on a relatively extensive scale of training facilities and appropriately located equipment depots. Furthermore, the planning for the employment of such forces, and the command and control mechanisms for directing them once they are employed, may well require a fundamental restructuring of existing command arrangements within the Department

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

of Defense, and new techniques of very high-level interdepartmental coordination. Serious consideration should probably be given to the development of such arrangements and techniques.

New Scientific Aids in Population Control (v)

(v) Before the computer age it has been extremely difficult to deal with the detailed data necessary to register every individual in a population, running, perhaps, to tens of millions.* Now such data can be stored, sorted, and made available by a computer contained in a small ship or building; communications facilities are good enough to make the information available at the point where the capture is made within an hour of the time when numerical descriptions of fingerprints plus vital statistics are sent in.

(v) To accumulate the necessary data, populations of whole villages would be fingerprinted, photographed, and required to provide vital statistics and personal histories, including the names and locations of all relatives. This could be done by police of the indigenous power (with such supervision by US advisers as might seem desirable for accuracy and thoroughness). Thereafter the data would be processed by electronic means that can be readily made available. Local police could then periodically sample group populations, picking up individuals at random at odd times and places, and any newcomers would have to explain themselves. The effect of an accurate, operating system of this kind on the morale of the guerrillas should be considerable.

(v) It is further possible by harmless technical means to establish whether an individual has been, within the past few months, in an area where his normal civilian occupations would not take him. Areas, such as swamps, jungles, and roadside weeds, not normally visited by civilians but of possible use to the guerrillas as staging areas, paths, ammunition and supply dumps, and ambush sites, could be sprayed from the air every

(v) * Identity cards were issued to the entire population of Malaya during the Emergency. This was accomplished by a highly sophisticated administrative machinery in a relatively small population. The Diem regime in South Vietnam, dealing with a population roughly three times as large, found this a task beyond its capabilities, even with American help.

CONFIDENTIAL

few weeks with harmless and invisible chemical substances* of types difficult or impossible to wash off completely. A prisoner, or an individual being subjected to spot check, could be tested for the presence of these substances on his skin; in favorable cases it might be possible to trace his movements for the past few weeks by such means.

Relationship of Isolation to Modern Counterinsurgency (u)

(u) Throughout this study the participants have endeavored to keep their attention focussed on one technique of counterinsurgency, that of isolating guerrilla forces from local and external support. In the process, however, we have been forced to consider the general nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, now as well as in the past, and to note other techniques which must be, or can be, employed in dealing with guerrilla forces involved in insurgency.

(u) We have noted that a tremendous research effort has been directed toward the problems of insurgency and counterinsurgency in this country in recent years. Yet again and again we have been struck by three apparent shortcomings either in the research or its application.

(u) First, there appears to be a dichotomy between research results and practice, both in the Government and in the field.

(u) Equally significant to us is the fact that there does not appear to have as yet been any concentrated effort made to investigate the possibility that development of a theory of counterinsurgency may be as feasible, and as useful doctrinally, as has been the effort devoted to development of theories of general and limited wars and of deterrence.

(u) Perhaps most important of all, we have not seen adequate recognition, in terms of theory, doctrine, or organization, that the United States is today faced with a largely new and

(c)*Harmless radiological or biological substances could also be used, but the political consequences would probably be unacceptable. Simple and harmless radioactive materials would be particularly adaptable, since these materials can be detected and identified by simple instruments at levels many thousandfold less than with biological materials.

CONFIDENTIAL

highly effective concept of guerrilla warfare which is being used by the Communist great powers to advance their own objectives by supporting "wars of national liberation."

In recognition of this situation we have attempted to develop a tentative "theory of isolation," as presented in the preceding chapter. Within the limits of our terms of reference we cannot with propriety do more. We believe it essential to stress, however, that this is only one aspect of a much larger, and extremely urgent, requirement.

Appendix A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Isolating the Guerrilla

I. Concept

The Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) proposes to examine the problem of isolating guerrillas. It defines this isolation as cutting off the support guerrillas receive from (a) their countrymen and (b) outside powers. The basic hypothesis is that guerrillas cannot remain operational unless they are supported by either or both of these sources. Case studies will include instances in which internal or external support was successfully interdicted. It is expected these will provide the necessary means of distinguishing effective and ineffective techniques.

The role of local sympathizers will be studied by first establishing: which sections of the population contributed leadership; which filled the ranks; and which supported with money, supplies, information, shelter, and other contributions short of actual armed support. This will help determine (among other things) whether prosperous elements in a nation have generally opposed Communist guerrillas, or whether a significant number have supported them, and if so for what reasons. On the assumption that guerrilla casualty rates are a function both of popular support and of the skill of soldiers and police, the study will also correlate these rates with military, political, and socio-logical features of each of the several insurrections. Particular attention will be paid to:

1. The impact of military successes by either side on popular attitudes.
2. Measures taken by government to separate the guerrillas from the rest of the population.
3. Measures taken by either side to win popular support.
4. The guerrillas' problems of logistical support.
5. Terrain problems.

In examining the role of outside powers who support guerrillas the study will consider: the related problems of acceptable loss rates and replacement flows; the provision of cadres and volunteers; the role of resupply, rest, and rehabilitation; outside intervention; and the impact of support to the guerrillas from nations hostile to the local government on the latter's policies,

on its allies, and on the morale of its sympathizers among the local population.

Through analysis of the basic historical studies, the project will seek to:

1. Clarify the functional relationships among the guerrillas, their sympathizers, and outside powers.
2. Provide a definitive study of the nature, timing, and components of local popular support.
3. Suggest means to separate the guerrillas from the rest of the population and so deprive them of logistical support, recruits, and information.
4. Suggest workable responses to outside support.

II. Background

In the years since 1793, when the Vendée section of France arose in an attempt to restore the French monarchy and simultaneously launched the first modern popular uprising that was linked neither with an army nor a state (unlike the guerrillas of the American Revolution) guerrilla warfare has grown in importance until today it seems established as the most common means whereby nations try to change boundaries and upset the balance of power. In these 170 years, different nations have had widely varying success in dealing with it. The French Republic put down the Vendée uprising, but failed in Haiti; the French empire could not cope with the Spaniards. Subsequent French regimes failed, won, failed again in Mexico and North Africa, and failed in Vietnam. Britain was successful with the Burmans, with the Boers, in the Northwest Frontier of India, and in Malaya; won in Kenya, failed in Cyprus and in Ireland. Guerrillas have included monarchists, republicans, Communists, nationalists, minority and majority groups, aristocrats, the middle class, peasants, Europeans, Africans, Arabs, Asians, Latin and North Americans. Guerrilla warfare is by no means a Communist monopoly nor, for that matter, is the Communist record one of unvarying success. The range of experience is a wide one, covering a long period of time.

On the basis of a cursory review of this experience it appears that the guerrilla must fail unless he has some base of support. To stay operational the guerrilla must have information about the government forces, he must have a steady supply of food, he must be able to replace his casualties, he needs a modest amount of ammunition, and he must be able to recruit. He can frequently hope to get food, drugs, and arms from outside the country, although these commodities can on occasion be obtained locally. He cannot get tactical information about local soldiers and police

from outside the country, and he has little use for replacements who do not fit easily into the life of the countryside in appearance, language, manner, and knowledge of the terrain. Therefore local support is essential while outside support is to be classed only as very desirable. Moreover, the guerrilla cannot dispense with support any more than the regular soldier can survive the smashing of his logistical base. Therefore, how to isolate the guerrilla from support seems to be a basic question well worth examining.

Appendix B

ARMED FORCES

Notes to Appendix B

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF MEASURES
TO ISOLATE GUERRILLA FORCES

I. Explanation of Analytical Criteria

A. Example. Based on case studies for this report, each of these examples analyzes instances, or series of instances, in which guerrilla operations took place and whether or not certain attempts were made to isolate the guerrilla from local and outside support. Each is self-contained and can be related to other examples in only a qualitative, not quantitative, comparison. There would be no validity in a statistical analysis based upon the body of examples as a whole, or upon any group selected from them.

B. Nature of the Guerrilla War and Support to Guerrilla Forces.

1. Environment or Terrain. Operations were carried out either in urban areas or rural. In the case of rural areas an attempt was made to identify the particular terrain utilized by the guerrillas--broad flat plains, mountainous areas, temperate forest, or jungle.

2. Related to an Ongoing Conventional War. In several instances guerrilla operations were being conducted as an adjunct to a conventional war being waged such as those in South Korea. In other instances guerrilla operations were being undertaken within the same time frame as an ongoing major conventional war, which could adversely or propitiously affect outside support to the guerrilla, but which might not be directly related to the example (such as the Chinese Civil War).

3. Motivation for Guerrillas and Internal Support. The underlying reason or motivation for each instance of conflict is broken down broadly into ideology (e.g., communism or

Roman Catholicism to name only two), nationalism, social protest (reaction to prevailing conditions), and terror (the application of which has often motivated support).

4. Nature of Effective External Support. External support, including military/material and political/moral, was usually sought by the guerrillas. Sanctuaries have also been sought, where available. In this analysis instances of outside support are recorded only if the attempts were successful and affected the situation to a recognizable degree.

C. Isolation from External Support. In instances where effective outside support was provided, an analysis of counterinsurgent attempts to cut this support included four techniques or objectives: physical interdiction (including blockades); invasion of sanctuary; propaganda; and economic measures. The first two responses were usually directed to military/material support while the second two were usually undertaken to counteract moral or political support.

D. Isolation from Local Support. The following objectives and techniques were chosen as significant and representative measures which the counterinsurgent utilized in order to cut off local support to the guerrilla. It is important to note here that "intelligence" is not mentioned as this technique is regarded as being present in and a constant to every counterinsurgent operation. Only variables are indicated.

1. Measures Affecting Guerrillas and Populace. The four measures included here--reward for defection, counterterror, obstacles, and propaganda--were directed toward both the guerrillas and/or the local population, depending upon an individual set of conditions.

2. Denying Support to Guerrillas. In denying the guerrillas their local support, two objectives are analyzed.

a. In order to control the population, the following techniques are measured: interdiction (physically preventing or controlling the movement of a person or persons); resettlement (moving a group of the population from one area to another); detention (holding and/or deporting an individual or individuals) which is here assumed to include concentration (holding of a large group of the population in a circumscribed area); and registration and/or surveillance (maintaining record of population and census and/or keeping track of identity, activities, and movement of the population).

b. In effectively controlling supplies, the following three techniques are observed: rationing (effective apportioning of prescribed amounts of food by counterinsurgent authorities to the inhabitants of an area); interdiction (the stopping or control of the movement of food and supplies along the roads and other routes of transport); and destruction and/or confiscation (the laying waste to the countryside with intent to destroy crops and production and/or the searching out and taking possession of illegal stores belonging to local inhabitants by counterinsurgent authorities).

3. Attracting Support to the Legal Government. In certain cases it has been found advantageous for purposes of isolation to attempt to use certain techniques in order to draw the sympathy of the population toward the counterinsurgent and away from the insurgents operating in that area. Four such techniques are observable.

a. Civic Action. Certain measures to alleviate prevailing social and/or health conditions may be undertaken by the counterinsurgents in towns and villages of a given area in order to offer the local inhabitants a better life.

b. Redress of Grievances. It has often been advantageous to offer to the population political alternatives to the one offered by the guerrillas as well as to the one previously in existence (i.e., the British in Malaya). This may decrease the dynamism of the insurgent cause.

c. Security from Terror. In many instances counterinsurgents have provided protection through military, police, and constabulary forces in order to prevent reprisals and revenge on potential, or actual, informers and sympathetic elements of the population.

d. Using Trained Local Leaders. Sympathy and support of the local population may be attracted to the counterinsurgents by the utilization of educated and trained local inhabitants in positions of influence and importance within the given area or country.

E. Successful Outcome of Counterinsurgency. Was the insurrection put down?

F. Same Side Wins as in Ongoing Conventional War. Self-explanatory.

II. Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols Used

N/A--Not applicable.

Rare--Used infrequently.

Varied--Used sporadically over a prolonged period of time.

?--Insufficient data to allow statement.

*--Used but not successfully either because the measure proved counterproductive or was ineffectual. In most such instances the measure was abandoned.

#--Used only in the Algerian example. Peter Paret states in Volume III that "In theory the French understood the importance of nonmilitary measures in this type of conflict, but in practice these measures suffered from representing an unacceptable national policy, from being ill-conceived, and from being carried out too often as an afterthought."

letter of the alphabet ("a," "b," "c," etc.)--refers to footnote.

III. Footnotes

a. Guerrilla operations were conducted by both sides, although primarily by the revolutionaries, who were successful.

b. In Spain there was considerable urban as well as rural guerrilla activity. In the Vendée and the Tyrol it was mainly rural.

c. Three operations were analyzed in which two were successfully carried out and one unsuccessfully terminated.

d. Guerrilla operations were being conducted at different times by both sides. Some guerrilla conflict was still in progress at the time major insurgent operations were terminated.

e. Confederate guerrillas made a few raids into the Northern States from Canada.

f. The Boer War provides the only important instance within the experiences analyzed during which "concentration" was implemented for purposes of consciously denying support to the guerrillas. As is explained above, concentration is defined for purposes here as detention on a larger scale.

g. The relationship existed, but quite indirectly.

h. Directly, but with an important exception. The opponents were on the same side in the conventional war. The CCP and the Kuomintang fought against the Japanese in World War II.

i. German use of resettlement was primarily related to punitive, suppressive, or Nazi political/ideological objectives, and only rarely or incidentally related to counterinsurrection activity.

j. The Communist insurgents had bases in the border regions of Thailand; there was some British-Thai military cooperation in attempting to eliminate these bases.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) 2233 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20007		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
3. REPORT TITLE ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA - VOLUME I (U)		2b. GROUP 3
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) One volume of a three volume final report.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) No principal author. Editor: T.N. Dupuy, Executive Director, HERO		
6. REPORT DATE 1 February 1966	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 103	7b. NO. OF REFS -
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. DA-49-092-ARO-102	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO. c. ARPA Order No. 687	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report) -	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT In addition to security requirements which apply to this document and must be met, each transmittal outside the agencies of the U.S. Government must have prior approval of Office, Chief of Research and Development, DA, ATTN: BESD.		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES -	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Advanced Research Projects Agency Office, Secretary of Defense	
13. ABSTRACT The study "Isolating the Guerrilla," consisting of three volumes, examines historical experience relevant to a politico-military technique of counterinsurgency: isolating guerrilla forces from internal and external support. Volume I contains the report analysis of the historical information reviewed. Volume II includes nine case studies which, for the purposes of this project, were considered to be either classic or basic. Volume III includes ten supporting case studies, which offer relevant experience, but which have not been explored in the same detail as the basic examples.		

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
Insurgency						
Counterinsurgency						
Guerrilla Warfare						

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

TOTAL P.02



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING COMMAND
ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE
P.O. BOX 12211
RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK NC 27709-2211

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Bill Bratton
U.S. Army Research Office
4300 S. Miami Blvd.
Durham, NC. 27703

Larry Downing
DTIC Security

October 20, 2004

Downgrade Classified Confidential Report:

AD#: AD382049

Title: Isolating the Guerrilla, Volume 1

This report is being downgraded and declassified by the U.S. Army Research Office.

Please change the distribution statement to:

Distribution Statement A

Approved for Public Release: Distribution is Unlimited

Please let me know if there is anything else needed.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Bill Bratton".

Bill Bratton
Librarian
U.S. Army Research Office
4300 S. Miami Blvd.
Durham, NC. 27703
919-549-4220